University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2013

International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers
Jean Galbraith
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, International Law
Commons, International Relations Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Legal Commons, Legal Theory
Commons, Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons, Political Theory Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons

Repository Citation
Galbraith, Jean, "International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers" (2013). Faculty Scholarship at
Penn Law. 1459.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1459

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

GALBRAITH_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE)

8/20/2013 2:44 PM

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DOMESTIC SEPARATION OF
POWERS
Jean Galbraith*
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 988
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS ...................... 992
A. International Law as an Input for Other Principles of
Constitutional Interpretation ................................................... 993
B. International Law as a Principle of Constitutional
Interpretation ........................................................................... 995
C. International Law as a Source of Extra-Constitutional
Legitimacy................................................................................ 998
II. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ANOMALY ..................................... 1001
A. Executive Power and Its Doctrinal Defenses ........................ 1002
B. The Absence of International Law ......................................... 1005
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE POWER ............................. 1008
A. Recognition ............................................................................ 1009
1. President Washington’s Recognition of France .............. 1010
2. The “Sole Organ” Principle and the Birth of the Idea of
Exclusive Presidential Recognition ................................. 1012
3. The Recognition of Cuba as a Separation-of-Powers
Debate ............................................................................. 1015
4. Exclusive Presidential Recognition in the Twentieth
Century ............................................................................ 1017
B. War Powers ........................................................................... 1019
1. Minor Engagements......................................................... 1020
2. Treaties as a Basis for Presidential Uses of Force ......... 1023
C. Sole Executive Agreements .................................................... 1027
1. Claims Settlement Agreements ........................................ 1028
2. Modi Vivendi ................................................................... 1031
* Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law at Camden. For helpful comments

and conversations regarding this piece, I thank Curtis Bradley, Hays Butler, Roger Clark,
Bill Dodge, Chimene Keitner, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, David Pozen, Robert Reinstein, Peter
Spiro, Edward Swaine, Beth Stephens, Ryan Williams, Ingrid Wuerth, and participants in the
ASIL International Law in Domestic Courts workshop held at Duke Law School, the Temple
Law School International Law Colloquium, the Philadelphia Junior International Law Scholars Workshop, and the Rutgers Junior Faculty Colloquium. I also thank James Barolo, Sarah
Buckley, Ronald Fisher, and other editors at the Virginia Law Review.

987

GALBRAITH_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE)

988

8/20/2013 2:44 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 99:987

IV. PAST PRACTICE TODAY ................................................................. 1033
A. Zivotofsky ............................................................................... 1034
B. Libya ...................................................................................... 1036
C. The ACTA............................................................................... 1039
V. RETHINKING PRESIDENTIAL POWER .............................................. 1042
A. Skepticism About Past Practice ............................................. 1042
B. Using International Law Going Forward.............................. 1046
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1048
INTRODUCTION

C

ONSIDER three notable recent assertions of the President’s foreign
affairs powers. First, in 2011, President Obama ordered U.S. armed
forces to attack Libya without any authorization from Congress.1 Second, in a case before the Supreme Court in the spring of 2012, the
Obama Administration refused to enforce a congressional statute involving the contents of U.S. passports on the ground that this statute intruded
on the President’s “exclusive” power to recognize foreign nations.2
Third, at various points in 2011 and 2012, the Obama Administration
has claimed that it can ratify an important international agreement on intellectual property without any clear authorization from Congress or the
Senate.3
These examples involve three very different areas of foreign relations
law—war powers, recognition, and treaty-making. Yet they have much
in common. All raise constitutional questions of the separation of powers between Congress and the President. All showcase aggressive assertions of presidential power to act either in the absence of congressional
legislation or in defiance of it. And all are defended by their supporters

1

See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in
Libya (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Libya Memorandum], available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.
2
Brief for Respondent at 13, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-699).
3
Fact Sheet, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ACTA: Meeting U.S. Objectives
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/
september/acta-meeting-us-objectives [hereinafter USTR Fact Sheet]; Letter from Ambassador Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade Representative, to Senator Ron Wyden (Dec. 7, 2011), available at
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Kirk-12072011.pdf; Letter from Harold
Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Senator Ron Wyden (Mar. 6, 2012),
available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/84365507-State-DepartmentResponse-to-Wyden-on-ACTA.pdf.
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not so much based on the Constitution’s text, but rather based on past
practice.
One other similarity is that these examples all relate to questions of
international law. The Libya intervention raised international legal questions regarding the use of force; the power at issue in the passport case is
the power to accord recognition as a matter of international law to foreign nations; and the intellectual property agreement would create international legal obligations for the United States. But those focused on the
separation of powers would be forgiven for letting this similarity pass
unnoticed. In the briefs, legal opinions, and academic commentary relating to these three examples of expansive presidential power, international law is mentioned at most only in passing.4 The relevant law—the interpretation of the Constitution—is taken to be a purely domestic matter.
These examples thus reveal the absence of international law from the
interpretive principles used today to determine the constitutional separation of powers.5 While international law can be an input for other principles of interpretation—for example, textualists might look to international law in determining the meaning of the phrase “declare war” in ArArticle I, Section 8—constitutional actors and commentators today do
not treat international law as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation in the separation of powers context. This absence should not be
surprising if constitutional interpretation is a purely domestic matter, and
there are many who think it should be. Justices Scalia and Thomas, for
example, treat international law as “irrelevant to the meaning of our
Constitution,” and their belief is shared by numerous members of Congress and distinguished legal scholars.6 What is surprising, however, is
4

See infra Part IV.
A few notes on terminology. First, my focus on this Article is on the separation of powers between the President and Congress in the foreign affairs context. Nonetheless, for shorthand I often use the broader term “separation of powers” rather than the more precise “separation of foreign affairs powers.” Second, I use the term “international law” in its usual sense
of encompassing both customary international law and treaties. From my examination, of the
two forms of international law, however, customary international law has mattered more as a
principle of constitutional interpretation. Third, I use the term “constitutional actors”
throughout to refer to members of the three branches of the federal government who play a
role in deciding what acts are constitutional.
6
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2053 n.12 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also,
e.g., H.R. 973, 112th Cong. (2011) (bill introduced in the House with about fifty co-sponsors
that would limit federal courts’ use of foreign law); S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposed resolution introduced in the Senate expressing the sense that the use of foreign law in
constitutional interpretation is appropriate only if it informs the “original meaning” of the
5
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that even those who consider international law to be a guiding principle
in other areas of constitutional interpretation do not seem to see it as
similarly important to the separation of powers. While they defend international law as an interpretive principle for most aspects of constitutional law—the territorial reach of the Constitution, the scope of the federal government’s powers, principles of federalism, and individual
rights—they do not describe it as similarly relevant to the separation of
powers.7 In other words, regardless of the role that international law
plays in other areas of constitutional interpretation, its bearing on the
separation of powers is limited.
It was not always this way. As this Article will show, international
law historically played a direct and important role in shaping the constitutional separation of powers between Congress and the President. This
role has been largely overlooked by contemporary scholarship because
this scholarship tends to focus on constitutional interpretation by the
courts, particularly the Supreme Court. The separation of foreign affairs
powers between Congress and the President, however, has mostly been
determined outside the courts, by the actions and inactions of the political branches. As it turns out, historically both political branches have relied on international law as an interpretive principle for determining the
boundaries of their constitutional powers.
Importantly, the role that international law has played in the separation of powers has not been a neutral one. Instead, constitutional actors
have typically relied on international law in ways that have strengthened
the powers of the President vis-à-vis Congress. Along with using international law as an input for other interpretive principles, constitutional
actors have relied on international law in two main ways. First, they
have sometimes used international law as a principle that directly guides
constitutional interpretation. Nineteenth-century proponents of the President’s sole power to recognize foreign nations, for example, asserted
that international law only recognized the pronouncements of executive
Constitution); see also academic sources cited infra note 19. These objections are typically
applied to both comparative and international law, are often combined under the label of
“foreign law,” and generally except the use of these sources as inputs for originalism.
7
See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 12–
27, 33–87 (2006); see also sources cited infra note 50. As discussed infra note 47, there is a
limited exception for the separation of powers regarding the conduct of hostilities (as opposed to the entry into hostilities). Here, some constitutional actors and scholars have recognized a role for international law as a principle of constitutional interpretation, albeit one that
is often closely tied to concerns about individual rights.
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actors, and therefore that the Constitution necessarily entrusted the power of recognition to the President. While international law could in theory be used to favor the powers of either Congress or the President, in
practice most uses of international law favored the President because of
the close connection perceived between executive action and international law. Second, constitutional actors have relied on international law
as an alternative source of legitimacy for presidential actions where the
constitutional basis for these actions was otherwise lacking or unclear.
While these precedents were initially understood and explained primarily in terms of international law, they ultimately became precedents for
expansive presidential powers as a matter of constitutional law.
The effects of international law’s role in the separation of powers remain with us today. They are shielded from present recognition but are
kept relevant by the most important tool in the interpretation of the separation of foreign affairs powers today: reliance on past practice. Past
practice offers a historical “gloss” on the separation of powers that is
understood to help resolve questions about it. This gloss has an opaque
quality: It makes past practices relevant without requiring a searching
inquiry into why these practices themselves took place. The historical
gloss thus shields the role that international law played in establishing
key precedents while at the same time causing these precedents to matter
greatly to our present-day constitutional interpretation. Indeed, as this
Article will show, the precedents in war powers, recognition, and treatymaking that the Obama Administration relied on to support its recent
aggressive stances in these areas all owe a debt to international law’s
past role in constitutional interpretation.
The role that international law has played in strengthening executive
power in turn holds implications both for how we understand the separation of powers today and for the relationship between presidential power
and international law. International law helped grow presidential power,
and members of Congress accepted this growth, in part because international law was also understood to impose certain constraints on presidential action. As this connection has eroded, however, it has created a
situation where neither the original congressional checks envisioned at
the Framing nor the international legal checks recognized in the hundred-and-fifty years that followed are understood to serve as strong constraints on presidential foreign affairs powers. This problematic situation
has been recently termed the “Executive Unbound” by Professors Eric
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Posner and Adrian Vermeule.8 This Article thus ends with some tentative thoughts on how to recapture the interplay between international
law and the separation of powers in a way that restores some constraints
on presidential power.
The rest of this Article develops and supports the themes outlined
above. Part I identifies three ways in which international law can influence constitutional interpretation: first, as an input for other principles of
constitutional interpretation; second, as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation; and third, as an alternative source of legitimacy for
actions that ultimately become constitutional precedents. Part II highlights what I call the “separation-of-powers anomaly”: the fact that while
many constitutional actors and commentators today accept international
law as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation in certain areas
of constitutional law, they do not treat it as similarly relevant to the separation of powers. Part III shows how international law has in fact been
used in the past by constitutional actors—particularly actors situated in
the political branches—in all three of the ways described in Part I to
help enhance the President’s foreign affairs powers. More specifically, I
focus on the roles played by international law in the separation of powers in three key areas: recognition, war powers regarding entry into hostilities, and treaty-making. Part IV uses the three current examples mentioned at the beginning of this Article to show how these enhanced
presidential powers continue today under the guise of reliance on past
practice, even though their international legal roots are now obscured
and any limits set by international law are thus lost. Finally, Part V considers the lessons this forgotten history holds for constitutional interpretation today, including the extent to which international law should constrain the President.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL ACCOUNTS
In recent years, the role of international law in constitutional interpretation has proved astonishingly contentious. Not only has it been the
subject of heated debate within Supreme Court decisions and among legal scholars, but it has become a cause célèbre in the public sphere more
generally. Backlash against the Supreme Court’s use of international law
8
See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the
Madisonian Republic (2010).
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in constitutional decision-making has even led to the introduction of
congressional legislation to curtail the use of foreign law by federal
courts. Justifying the need for such legislation, the chief sponsor of one
recent bill explained that by “interject[ing] international law into their
rulings,” Supreme Court justices have shown “transparent disregard for
the Constitution.”9
A closer look at the controversy shows that it focuses not on all uses
of international law in constitutional interpretation, but rather largely on
one particular role that international law can play in constitutional interpretation. This is the role that international law can play as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation—as something that guides the process by which constitutional actors approach the Constitution. But this is
not the only role that international law can play in constitutional interpretation. It has at least two other possible roles as well. One is to serve
as a source of information—an input—that assists constitutional actors
applying other principles of constitutional interpretation. The other, less
conventional role that international law can play is to help justify constitutionally dubious actions by serving as an extra-constitutional source of
legitimacy.
This Part describes all three roles that international law can play in
constitutional interpretation. I begin with international law’s role as an
input for other theories of constitutional interpretation, then turn to its
more contentious role as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation. Lastly, I discuss how international law might influence constitutional interpretation by serving as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy.
A. International Law as an Input for Other Principles of Constitutional
Interpretation
The least controversial role that international law plays in constitutional interpretation is to serve as an input for other principles of constitutional interpretation. If one believes, for example, that the Constitution
should be interpreted according to its text’s ordinary meaning at the time
of the Framing, then the law of nations at the time of the Framing will
obviously be relevant for interpreting the clauses in the Constitution that
9
Sandy Adams, Op-Ed., Ban Foreign Law from Courts; We Make Our Own Laws, Wash.
Times, Mar. 10, 2011, at B3; see also H.R. 973, 112th Cong. (2011) (bill introduced by Rep.
Adams and numerous co-sponsors to limit federal courts’ use of foreign law).
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implicitly or explicitly reference international legal standards. Scholars
applying this approach have accordingly looked to the law of nations at
the time of the Framing in understanding the meaning of terms like “declare war” that appear in the Constitution’s text.10
Here international law serves as an input for a form of textualism, but
it can also be an input for other interpretive approaches. Those who apply a textualism that considers the evolving meaning of words, for example, could look to the evolving meaning of “treaty” in international
law to interpret the clauses of the Constitution that refer to treaties.11
Similarly, those who emphasize the original intentions of the Framers
could find international law at the time of the Framing relevant to understanding these intentions.12 As yet another example, structural constitutionalists guided by the tripartite scheme set forth by Justice Jackson in
Youngstown could view international law, or at least certain forms of international law, as inputs comparable to congressional legislation—for
instance, as having the power structurally to put the President at his
maximum authority (category 1) or alternatively at his “lowest ebb”
(category 3).13
10
See e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 Va. L. Rev. 729, 735 (2012) (exploring “the original public meaning of several specific constitutional powers—such as the power to recognize foreign nations, the war
power, and the powers to authorize reprisals and captures—which can only be understood
against background assumptions provided by the law of nations” (emphasis omitted)); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1543, 1545 (2002) (looking to international law around the time of the framing to understand the textual meaning of
the “declare war” clause); see also Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander-in-Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 61,
82–95 (2007) (looking to international law to interpret the scope of the commander-in-chief
power at the time of the Framing).
11
E.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 302 cmt. c & reporters’ note 2
(1987) (asserting that the “references in the Constitution presumably incorporate the concept
of treaty and of other agreements in international law” and then looking to twentieth-century
international law to define the reach of this concept).
12
This approach seems to be underlying Justice Scalia’s use of international law in his recent dissent in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2513 (2012) (relying on international law at the time of the Framing in interpreting the boundaries of state and federal sovereignty).
13
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring); cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524–27 (2008) (holding that the President acts in Youngstown category 3 when he tries to transform non-self-executing treaty obligations into domestic law obligations). There is room for debate as to which international
law obligations—namely, self-executing treaties, non-self-executing treaties, and customary
international law—should be treated as comparable to congressional statutes for this purpose.
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In all these instances, international law does not operate as a principle
of constitutional interpretation. Rather, it serves as an input for other interpretive principles, in the same way that dictionary definitions might
be inputs for textualists, or that historical influences on the Framers
might be inputs for originalists. This reality makes the role played by international law relatively uncontroversial, but also makes the role dependent in two ways on the interpretive principle that controls its use.
First, international law’s role is dependent on the extent to which its users rely on the interpretive principle in the first place. For example, constitutional actors will rely on international law as an input to the Framers’ intent only to the extent to which they find the Framers’ intent to be
a guiding principle of constitutional interpretation. Second, where international law is an input for another interpretative principle, it is bound
by whatever constraints are imposed by that interpretive principle. A
textualist seeking to recover the original public meaning of the Constitution, for example, might care only about international law at the time of
the Framing, not about its dramatic evolution over the subsequent two
centuries.
B. International Law as a Principle of Constitutional Interpretation
A more controversial role that international law can play in constitutional interpretation is to directly influence the process of constitutional
interpretation. International law will never be the sole principle used for
interpreting the Constitution, but it can serve as an influential supplement to other interpretative approaches. Constitutional actors and commentators who look to international law as a principle of interpretation
typically do so by presuming that the Constitution should be interpreted
to maximize conformity with international law. The strength of this presumption can vary from the lightest of touches to a substantial weight.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons14 illustrates how
international law can serve as a principle of constitutional interpretation.
In holding that the death penalty is an unconstitutional punishment for
crimes committed by minors, the Supreme Court applied a faint—very
faint—presumption in favor of reading the Constitution to be in accordance with international legal norms, which bar the use of the death penalty against minors.15 These international legal norms did not apply di14
15

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Id. at 575–78.
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rectly to the United States (which had never consented to the treaty provisions setting forth these norms), but the Court nonetheless viewed
them as “instructive” and providing “respected and significant confirmation” for its conclusion.16
Roper and similar cases triggered a backlash against the use of international law as a principle of constitutional interpretation. Writing in
dissent, Justice Scalia urged that “the basic premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”17 While Justice Scalia based
his objections on a sense of American exceptionalism, others have also
emphasized that reliance on international law as a principle of constitutional interpretation is undemocratic, as it draws on the views of those
outside the United States.18 Still others view its use as simply unnecessary and unhelpful given the other array of tools of constitutional interpretation. In alarmist tones, Professor Roger Alford has suggested that
reliance on international law “fundamentally destabilizes the equilibrium
of constitutional decisionmaking” by adding a “new source” to the traditional interpretive tools of “text, structure, history, and national experience.”19
Roper and the other Supreme Court cases at the center of the recent
controversy deal mostly with the interpretation of individual rights provisions in the Constitution.20 But scholars sympathetic to the use of in16

Id. at 575, 578.
Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18
Chief Justice Roberts made this point at his confirmation hearing. See Transcript: Day
Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/13/AR2005091300876.ht
ml (noting a “concern” based on “democratic theory” with regard to citing foreign law in
constitutional interpretation); see also, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, An American
Amendment, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 475, 476 (2009) (“[T]he notion that [developments
in constitutional law] may be brought about by changes in foreign law violates basic premises of democratic self-governance.”).
19
Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 Am. J.
Int’l L. 57, 57–58 (2004). For an example of other scholarship objecting to the Supreme
Court’s use of international law, see, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms
from a ‘Wider Civilization’: Lawrence and the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1283 (2004); cf.
Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007
U. Ill. L. Rev. 637, 639 n.9 (giving numerous citations to scholarship condemning the use of
foreign law); Rosenkranz, supra note 18.
20
Other cases include Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (life sentences
without the possibility of parole for juveniles who committed crimes other than murder);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573–77 (2003) (substantive due process in context of the
17
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ternational law as a principle of constitutional interpretation have
demonstrated that in the past the Supreme Court has taken a similar approach in other areas of constitutional law. Professor Sarah Cleveland
shows that the Supreme Court has used international law as a “background principle”21 of constitutional interpretation not only in individual
rights cases, but also in past cases dealing with the territorial reach of
constitutional rights, the extent of the federal government’s powers, and
federalism.22 Cleveland’s far-reaching survey brings what is probably
the widest scholarly lens applied to the issue of international law’s role
in constitutional interpretation. Yet, as I discuss in Part II.B, even Cleveland finds little role for international law as a background principle of
constitutional interpretation in the context of separation-of-powers disputes.
Before turning to the third role that international law can play in constitutional interpretation, it is worth noting that it is not always easy to
distinguish between the first two roles. For one thing, constitutional actors do not always clearly explain how or why they are using international law in constitutional interpretation. For another, the roles can
blend together conceptually and practically. Conceptually, for example,
the roles would blend together for a believer in original intent who concludes that the Framers intended the Constitution’s interpreters to use
evolving international law as an interpretive principle. Practically, for
example, one could treat Roper as using international law as a direct
principle of constitutional interpretation (as I do) or could instead claim
that the Court was instead applying some unspoken morality-based or
functionalist principle of interpretation to which international law was
effectively serving as an input. Yet the distinction is nonetheless helpful,
for two reasons. First, it captures a genuine difference in how constitutional actors can make use of international law, even if this difference is
not discernible in every instance. Second, it helps explain why, in the
debate over the use of international law in constitutional interpretation,
some uses of international law are relatively uncontroversial while others are fiercely contested.

right to privacy); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316–17 (2002) (death penalty); and
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (plurality opinion) (death penalty).
21
Cleveland, supra note 7, at 33.
22
Id. at 33–62.
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C. International Law as a Source of Extra-Constitutional Legitimacy
The two roles described above are conventional ones, whatever one
thinks of their merits. There is a question of constitutional interpretation
and an answer is needed; through these roles, international law can help
constitutional actors reach the answer. But constitutional law does not
always develop through tidy processes. Sometimes constitutional actors
act in response to perceived problems without even considering or justifying the constitutionality of their actions. At other times, they can
choose deliberately to act in ways that they believe violate the Constitution—think Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase—or in ways
that they can justify only through dubious constitutional interpretation.
Such precedents in turn can influence the shape of constitutional law going forward.
When do constitutional actors violate the Constitution or aggressively
push its boundaries? In a recent essay, Professor Richard Pildes suggests
that the answer may lie in a “kind of consequentialist framework” in
which the actors “take law into account as an exceptionally important
factor, but still only as a factor.”23 Constitutional actors are reluctant to
violate the Constitution, whether out of their own fidelity to it or because of the political importance attached to compliance with it. Yet
they may do so if the perceived benefits are high enough and they believe their actions will be deemed legitimate in the eyes of the public.
Pildes gives the example of President Obama’s decision to continue using military force in Libya despite the absence of supportive legislation
from Congress and suggests that while this decision may have been unconstitutional, it was sufficiently wise policy that the U.S. political
community let it pass largely unchallenged.24
Pildes treats policy considerations as the main source of extraconstitutional legitimacy. But international law itself could also be a
source of such legitimacy. Decision-makers could justify actions that vi23
Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1419 (2012) (book
review) (specifically discussing the President). For a few other recent perspectives on the
relationship between law and power, see generally Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8; Curtis
A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv.
L. Rev. 411 (2012) (a piece whose title influenced my own choice of title); Frederick Schauer, Is Legality Political?, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 481 (2011); see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1257 (2004) (arguing that
the Constitution contains an embedded principle of necessity that authorizes violations of
specific constitutional provisions under appropriate circumstances).
24
Pildes, supra note 23, at 1421.
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olate or aggressively push the boundaries of the Constitution partly on
the grounds that these actions are appropriate under international law.
The Libya conflict itself provides a possible example of this. In using
force in Libya, President Obama had the sanction of international law—
the Security Council of the United Nations had authorized the intervention—and indeed it is unlikely that he would have ordered the use of
force without this authorization.25 This international authorization in turn
may have played a role in reducing domestic resistance to President
Obama’s decision to keep using force despite the absence of congressional authorization.26 Accordingly, even if this international authorization did not affect the constitutional question as a matter of doctrine, it
may nonetheless have affected the constitutional resolution as a matter
of politics.
One need not approve of international law serving as an extraconstitutional source of legitimacy in order to accept that, as a descriptive matter, it may in fact do so. Two further factors help explain why it
may have been especially influential at various times in the past. The
first is that respect for international law within the U.S. political community has not been constant over time. While in recent times politicians
have scored points by describing international law as a dangerous threat
to American values, at other times in our history—such as the time of
the Framing or right around the end of World War II—international law
was treated, in the political discourse, with intense and at times over-

25
See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Authorizes No-Fly Zone in Libya, FoxNews.com (Mar.
17, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/17/seeks-resolution-authorizing-widerange-strikes-libya/ (reporting that “[t]he Obama Administration has said it would not act
without Security Council authorization”).
26
Supporters of the Libya intervention made a point of mentioning the Security Council
Resolution very often. E.g., Letter from President Barack Obama to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives (Mar. 21, 2011), available at http://media.washtimes.com/media/
misc/2011/03/22/2011libyamilitaryrel.pdf (mentioning the Security Council and its resolution eight times in a one-and-a-half page letter); Testimony of Harold Hongju Koh before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 28, 2011, available at http://www.state.gov/
s/l/releases/remarks/167250.htm (mentioning the Security Council resolution seven times in
his prepared remarks on the domestic law questions); see also Dustin Tingley & Michael
Tomz, How Does the U.N. Security Council Influence Public Opinion 1–2 (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://politics.virginia.edu/sites/politics.virginia.edu/files/
Tomz-LLB.pdf (conducting experiments through public opinion surveys and finding that
U.N. Security Council Resolutions substantially increase U.S. public opinion in support of
military actions because citizens feel a sense of commitment to follow through on these resolutions).
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whelming respect.27 The greater the public respect for international law,
the more international law justifications might be accepted as sources of
extra-constitutional legitimacy.
The second reason international law’s influence may have been greater in the past has to do with a particular constitutional argument. The
Take Care Clause in Article II provides that the President is to “take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”28 but its text does not specify
whether these “Laws” include international law. Recently, the Supreme
Court has suggested that this reference to “Laws” excludes many treaties, and similar reasoning might justify a conclusion that “Laws” also
excludes customary international law.29 In the past, however, up to at
least as recently as the 1980s, the Take Care Clause was commonly understood to apply to international law.30 The Take Care Clause thus
served as a bridge between the Constitution and international law, at
least where actions by the President were concerned. Where the Presi27
See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. L. Rev.
799, 883–85 (1995) (describing the powerful internationalist climate in the United States
around the end of World War II); David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 932, 937–39 (2010) (describing respect of the Framers for
international law).
28
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
29
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (effectively concluding that the Take Care
Clause does not apply to non-self-executing treaties); see also Edward T. Swaine, Taking
Care of Treaties, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 331, 335 (2008) (noting that the Take Care Clause has
“fallen out of favor”). The reasoning in Medellin is brief, unsupported, and seemingly ignorant of the history of the Take Care Clause’s interpretation—and therefore may well not
prove to be the Court’s final word on this issue. Such as it is, however, the Court’s discussion in Medellin implies that “Laws,” for purposes of the Take Care Clause, must create domestic legal obligations, not merely international legal obligations. Applying this approach,
customary international law would constitute “Laws” only to the extent that it amounts to
domestic law—an issue which has been hotly disputed since Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L.
Goldsmith published their famous article, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997).
30
E.g., Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111 cmt. c (1987); Presidential
Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C.
185, 186 (1980). This understanding was articulated as far back as the Washington Administration. Pacificus Number I (June 29, 1793), in Alexander Hamilton & James Madison, The
Pacificus-Helvidius Debate of 1793–1794, at 16 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007) [hereinafter
Pacificus-Helvidius Debate] (stating that “Our Treaties and the laws of Nations form a part
of the law of the land” with regard to the Take Care Clause); Helvidius Number II (Aug. 31,
1793), in id. at 72 (considering it a “truth” that the “executive is charged with the execution
of all laws, the laws of nations as well as the municipal law which recognizes and adopts
those laws”) (emphasis omitted); see also Restoration of a Danish Slave, 1 Op. Att’y Gen.
566, 570–71 (1852).
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dent acted to execute international law, he could justify his actions as a
matter of constitutional law on the ground that he was taking care of international law even where he was acting without any other plausible
bases of constitutional power.
II. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS ANOMALY
One of the striking developments of constitutional law since the
Framing has been the rise of presidential power. This is especially true
where foreign affairs powers are concerned. If the Constitution poses an
“invitation” for the President and Congress to “struggle for the privilege
of directing American foreign policy,” as Edwin Corwin famously observed,31 then the President is the accepted winner. While struggles continue over the allocation of foreign affairs powers between the two political branches, the “lion’s share” of power lies clearly with the
President.32
Doctrinally, constitutional actors both within and outside the courts
now justify the President’s enormous foreign affairs powers through a
variety of interpretive principles, most prominently the embrace of past
practice as a “gloss” on lawful presidential power. But interestingly, today these principles do not include international law. International law is
certainly understood to inform the constitutional separation of powers
via the first of the three roles described in the prior Part, typically as an
input for textualism and originalism.33 But even constitutional actors and
commentators who are sympathetic to the use of international law as a
direct principle of interpretation in other areas of constitutional law do
not seem to see it as playing that role for the separation of foreign affairs
powers. This is a curious anomaly, especially since foreign relations law
31
See Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1948, at 208 (1948).
For a flavor of the massive literature, see generally Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the
U.S. Constitution 31–62 (1996); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8; Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., The Imperial Presidency (1973); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545 (2004); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum.
L. Rev. 1 (1993); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231 (2001).
32
Corwin, supra note 31, at 208.
33
See supra note 10; see also, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal
Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum. L. Rev.1, 5–6 (2009) (arguing that a distinction in the
law of nations at the time of the Framing between perfect and imperfect rights informs how
the judicial branch should understand the separation of powers between it and the political
branches on matters that relate to customary international law).
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is the area of constitutional law with the most direct connections to international law.
This Part first outlines the conventional justifications for the President’s expansive foreign affairs powers, with a particular focus on the
role of past practice. It then discusses how notably absent international
law is from these justifications and suggests that this absence may be
due to the fact that scholarship examining the role of international law in
constitutional interpretation has focused almost exclusively on the Supreme Court and overlooked constitutional decision-making by the two
political branches.
A. Executive Power and Its Doctrinal Defenses
The checks and balances developed by the Framers have not held up
well against the “maxim attributed to Napoleon that ‘[t]he tools belong
to the man who can use them.’”34 The text of the Constitution grants the
President only a few clear foreign affairs powers: the role of the commander in chief, the authority to receive ambassadors, and the powers,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties and
appoint ambassadors.35 But Presidents began taking expansive views of
their foreign affairs powers as early as the Washington Administration
and aggressively resisted congressional encroachment on their perceived
prerogatives. Today, the additional foreign affairs powers recognized as
belonging to the President, either solely or concurrently with Congress,
include the following: to formulate foreign policy for the United States;
to be the “sole organ” of communication with other nations on behalf of
the United States; to represent the United States at international organizations; to recognize foreign nations; to waive obligations owed to the
United States by other nations; to enter into executive agreements with
other nations that are binding as a matter of international law and in at
least some instances can preempt state law; to interpret treaties in the
first instance; to withdraw the United States from treaties; and to authorize the use of force abroad by U.S. troops in pursuit of U.S. interests, at
least up to a certain threshold of engagement. The divergence between
the President’s real and paper powers is so great that Louis Henkin ob-

34
35

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).
U.S. Const. art. II.
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served that “[w]hat the Constitution says and does not say, then, can not
have determined what the President can and can not do.”36
What has determined what the President can and cannot do? There are
vast literatures in history and political science on this subject,37 but those
interested in law tend to focus on two sets of legal principles which have
explicitly or implicitly authorized the expansion of presidential power.
First, there are justiciability rules such as the political question doctrine
which courts have developed to avoid making difficult decisions about
the constitutional scope of presidential power. The effect of these rules
is to shift decision-making about the limits of presidential power from
the courts to executive branch lawyers, who have stronger institutional
reasons for siding with the President.38 Second, and more importantly for
the purposes of this Article, there are interpretive principles governing
constitutional interpretation. Not all of these principles tend to favor expansive executive power, and none do so all the time. Constitutional
scholars who emphasize the original intent of the Framers, for example,
tend to disapprove of today’s expansive presidential power, as do scholars who emphasize the structural importance of robust checks and balances.39 Scholars who emphasize a textual approach can disagree among
each other dramatically over the degree to which the Constitution’s text

36

Henkin, supra note 31, at 31.
Political science approaches emphasize institutional features that have given the President a practical edge over Congress, such as his advantages as a unitary rather than collective
actor, and the influence of the party system on the relationship between the political branches. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 453; Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2314–15 (2006). Historical approaches tend to focus on the times and circumstances of particular Presidents. E.g., G.
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85
Va. L. Rev. 1 (1999).
38
See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration 35 (2007) (“Legal advice to the President from the Department of Justice is neither
like advice from a private attorney nor like a politically neutral ruling from a court. It is
something inevitably, and uncomfortably, in between.”); Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis
in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1502 (2010) (noting that although
the Office of Legal Counsel seeks to provide its best view of the law, this role “need not carry the pretense of ‘true’ neutrality”).
39
E.g., Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent
of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L. Rev. 527, 623–36 (1974) (advocating an original understanding of the Treaty Clause that would give more power to the
Senate); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking,
54 UCLA L. Rev. 309, 314–15 (2006) (drawing on structural arguments, among others, in
urging limits on the President’s foreign affairs powers).
37
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supports expansive presidential powers.40 Yet expansive presidential
power has one particular ally among the principles of interpretation—an
ally so important that it arguably dwarfs the other principles in importance in the separation of powers context. This is reliance on past
practice, which “is a mainstay of decisionmaking and debates concerning the scope of presidential power.”41
Reliance on past practice has widespread acceptance as an interpretive principle among constitutional actors. As early as 1796, President
Washington defended his view of the limited role held by the House of
Representatives in treaty-making in part on the ground that this reflected
the practice to date.42 Since then, constitutional actors have considered
the presence (or absence) of past practice in resolving virtually all separation-of-powers disputes. In theory, of course, past practice can cut in
favor of either the President or Congress. In actuality, however, past
practice has furthered gradual accretions of presidential power because
the President, as a unitary actor unhindered by the collective action challenges that constrain Congress, has both the incentives and the abilities
to push the boundaries repeatedly.43
As Professors Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison argue, however,
the concept of past practice needs to be unpacked. Constitutional actors
and scholars will sometimes further define past practice in terms of two
factors: first, the amount of past practice on point, and, second, the extent to which Congress has acquiesced in this past practice.44 But this
40

Consider, for example, the debate over whether and to what extent the Vesting Clause of
Article II is a source of unenumerated presidential powers. Compare Prakash & Ramsey,
supra note 31, at 252–55, with Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 31, at 546–52.
41
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and
Legal Constraint, 113 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013). Another important ally is functionalist reasoning. See, e.g., Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs
Constitution, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, 89–93 (2009). For example, in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936), Justice Sutherland emphasized that the President needed broad foreign affairs powers “if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our
aims achieved.”
42
George Washington, Message to the House of Representatives, Declining to Submit
Diplomatic Instructions and Correspondence (Mar. 30, 1796), available at http://millercen
ter.org/president/speeches/detail/3461 (“In this construction of the Constitution every House
of Representatives has heretofore acquiesced; and until the present time, not a doubt or suspicion has appeared to my knowledge that this construction was not the true one.”).
43
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 412–15.
44
In his concurrence in Youngstown, Justice Frankfurter offers the most famous articulation of these factors:
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breakdown only begs further questions in terms of what counts as past
practice on point or as congressional acquiescence. Professors Bradley
and Morrison focus on acquiescence and show that how acquiescence is
defined can dramatically affect the extent to which it is satisfied.45 Acquiescence could be understood to mean the absence of any congressional legislation regarding a presidential practice, or it could mean the
lack of objection from any members of Congress regarding this practice,
or it could mean congressional legislation explicitly or implicitly approving a presidential practice. The meaning chosen will significantly
affect the extent of acquiescence because some of these forms of acquiescence (for example, the absence of congressional legislation) are easier to come by than others (for example, the presence of affirming legislation). While Professors Bradley and Morrison focus on acquiescence,
this Article will consider in Part IV how broad or narrow treatments of
past practice can similarly affect what is understood to be constitutional.
B. The Absence of International Law
International law does not currently feature among the interpretive
principles used to resolve separation of powers questions. While international law certainly plays a role in current separation-of-powers disputes,
it does so almost exclusively as an input for other means of constitutional interpretation—most notably originalism and textualism. While international law has been found to be a direct principle of interpretation in
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to
the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon
them. . . . [A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, mak[es] as it were such exercise of
power part of the structure of our government.
343 U.S. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (linking this argument to the Vesting Clause
in Article II). In calling for a “systematic, unbroken” practice that is “never before questioned” by Congress, Justice Frankfurter sets a high bar and appears to require both factors
for past practice to count at all. Quite commonly, however, constitutional actors relying on
past practice take a looser approach and require less robust levels of past practice and/or acquiescence. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting the
Frankfurter language but also quoting looser language from United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915), about the need for a “‘long-continued practice, known to and
acquiesced in by Congress’” and in practice applying a fairly shallow inquiry into both factors); Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 4–9 (quoting Justice Frankfurter’s reference to
the historical “gloss” but not further quoting his stringent requirements for this gloss to be
satisfied).
45
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 432–47.
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many areas of constitutional law,46 it is rarely seen as such in the context
of the separation of foreign affairs powers—even though these powers
are the ones most directly connected to international law.
This fact is evident from a look at the extensive scholarship in the last
decade on the role of international law in constitutional interpretation.
Except for some work on the conduct of hostilities,47 this scholarship
does not discuss international law’s role in the separation of powers,
other than to the extent that it is an input for other principles of constitutional interpretation. Professor Cleveland, for example, shows at length
how international law serves as an input for interpreting clauses in the
Constitution that relate to the separation of powers,48 but when considering the role that international law can play as a “background principle
for constitutional analysis,” she does not include the separation of powers in the many areas of constitutional law that she covers.49 Another
lengthy historical treatment of international law in constitutional interpretation by Professors Steven Calabresi and Stephanie Zimdahl finds
that the Supreme Court “rarely cites foreign sources of law in structural
constitutional cases,” with the exception of some federalism decisions.50
46

See Cleveland, supra note 7, at 33–62.
Professor Ingrid Wuerth, for example, argues that international law can be a valuable
“second-order tool of constitutional interpretation” in assessing the scope of the President’s
Commander-in-Chief powers. Wuerth, supra note 10, at 74–82. Nonetheless, even with regard to the conduct of hostilities, much of the literature considering the relationship between
international law and presidential power does not consider the role that international law
might play as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation in the separation of powers.
Rather, it looks at (1) how international law influences the interpretation of congressional
statutes that in turn enable or constrain the President, for example, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 517–22 (2004) (plurality opinion) (relying on the law of war in interpreting a congressional statute); or (2) how international law serves as a direct principle of constitutional
interpretation with regard to individual rights, for example, id. at 531 (“[T]he law of war and
the realities of combat may render [certain] detentions both necessary and appropriate, and
our due process analysis need not blink at those realities.”).
48
See Cleveland, supra note 7, at 12–27 (covering separation-of-powers related issues
where the Constitution makes “express reference to international law or to a concept of international law”).
49
Id. at 33–63; see also id. at 63–87 (treating individual rights related issues in a separate
section, but with an analysis that similarly shows international law’s use as a background
principle of constitutional interpretation).
50
Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign
Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision,
47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 743, 906 (2005). For examples of other scholarship that look broadly at the role of international law in constitutional interpretation but either do not address the
separation of powers or treat international law mainly as an input for other principles of interpretation in that context, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of
47
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There are several possible reasons why international law might not be
seen as a relevant principle for resolving separation-of-powers disputes
by those who treat it as such in other areas of constitutional law. Perhaps
international law is not and has not been particularly relevant to separation-of-powers issues for structural reasons. International law is sometimes said to speak to the substance of what states can and cannot do rather than to the process by which they do it. Since the separation of
powers is a question of internal process, international law might not shed
any light upon it. Professor Vicki Jackson, for example, claims that “international law simply does not address many important constitutional
issues having to do with the structure of government.”51 But this claim
suggests too strong a divide between substance and process. While international law may not dictate the constitutional structures of government, it may influence these structures. For one thing, not all international law is about substance. Some of it does have to do with process,
such as default rules governing treaty-making and other communications
between nations. For another thing, even where international law is substantive, nations might benefit from using it in designing their internal
structural rules. Actions that violate international law, for example, are
likely to generate more international friction than actions that comply
with international law, and so nations might wish to set a higher internal
threshold for engaging in such actions.
Another possible explanation for why international law is not thought
of as a principle for resolving separation-of-powers disputes is that the
Supreme Court has done little, if anything, to use it as such. Scholars interested in the role of international law in constitutional interpretation
have focused almost exclusively on the Supreme Court and its approach
to constitutional interpretation. Professors Cleveland, Calabresi, and
Zimdahl, for example, define their projects on the role of international
law in constitutional interpretation in terms of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the subject.52 The scholarly focus on the Supreme Court
Our Law, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 43 (2004); Larsen, supra note 19, at 1283–87; Parrish, supra note
19, at 638–42; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 82, 82 (2004) (“Sound constitutional interpretation combines other constitutional principles and structures with conceptions derived from contemporary international practice.”).
51
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons: The Youngstown
Decision and American Exceptionalism, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 191, 212 (2006).
52
Calebresi & Zimdahl, supra note 50, at 748–56; Cleveland, supra note 7, at 2–12. The
other sources cited in supra note 50 also focus overwhelmingly on the Supreme Court. (For
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is understandable, since it is the governmental body that plays the greatest overall role in U.S. constitutional law today. But this focus may also
underemphasize the role of international law in areas of constitutional
law that the Supreme Court is more hesitant about addressing. Chief
among these areas is the distribution of foreign affairs powers between
Congress and the President. While the Supreme Court does sometimes
address this distribution, it does so rarely, cautiously, and often only after longstanding practices have been established by the political branches. To see this practice, however—and to see if international law plays a
role in its creation—we must look to the constitutional interpretations by
members of Congress and the Executive branch.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE POWER
This Part looks at the role that international law has played in shaping
the separation of powers in three key areas of foreign relations law:
recognition, war powers, and treaty-making. For reasons mentioned
above, it focuses largely on constitutional decision-making by Congress
and the executive branch. In all of these areas, I find that international
law has influenced the constitutional separation of powers in ways that
go beyond simply serving as an input for other principles of interpretation. Importantly, rather than being neutral, the influence of international
law has typically served to strengthen the President’s powers vis-à-vis
Congress. Thus, though it may seem counterintuitive, the imperial Presidency of today owes something to international law.
The history of recognition, war powers, and treaty-making in the
United States could each fill many volumes. My review here is necessarily selective, and two caveats in particular apply. First, although I
cover all three of the roles discussed in Part I that international law has
played in shaping the constitutional division of foreign affairs powers, I
pay particular attention to international law’s role as a direct principle of
constitutional interpretation and as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy. I do this because these roles are the least accepted, and thus
the most interesting, as a matter of legal doctrine today. Second, I mostan interesting recent exception focusing on the role of comparative law in the process of
congressional legislation-making, see a piece by Katerina Linos, Legislative Borrowing, 106
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 149 (2012).) Constitutional scholarship more generally, however, is
increasingly taking into account the role of the political branches in shaping constitutional
law. E.g., Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (1999).
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ly discuss moments of constitutional decision-making where the decision-makers took international law into account. This over-emphasizes
the direct influence of international law in the constitutional separation
of powers, since I do not give equal attention to moments that lack evidence of decision-makers taking international law into account. My aim
here is to show that international law has mattered in shaping the domestic separation of powers, not to try to quantify the precise degree across
history that it has done so.
A. Recognition
Over the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, some of the most
vexing foreign affairs questions confronting the United States were issues of recognition. Should it recognize the revolutionary government of
France? Venezuela and its neighbors as they broke away from Spain?
Texas? Cuba? These questions implicated U.S. security since, as President Jackson observed in relation to Texas, “the power of originally recognizing a new state [is a] power the exercise of which is equivalent,
under some circumstances, to a declaration of war.”53 Yet the text of the
Constitution does not provide clear guidance as to which branch of government can exercise this power and under what circumstances. The
President is vested with the executive power of the United States and is
specifically given the power to receive ambassadors; the President and
the Senate between them have the power to make treaties and appoint
ambassadors; and Congress has the power to regulate foreign commerce
and the powers conferred by the necessary and proper clause. The power
of recognition must lie somewhere, but it is not obvious which branch or
branches possess it.
Starting immediately after the Framing, international law played a
role in leading U.S. constitutional interpreters to conclude that the President could exercise the power of recognition. President Washington relied partly on international law as a source of extra-constitutional legitimacy in recognizing the revolutionary government of France without
congressional approval. Later, over the course of the nineteenth century,
the executive branch moved increasingly towards the position that it was
solely entrusted with the power of recognition. Here, again, international
law played a role, primarily as a direct principle of constitutional inter53
Andrew Jackson, Message to Congress Regarding Texas (Dec. 21, 1836), in 1 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law 99 (1906).
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pretation supporting the executive’s position. By a few decades into the
twentieth century, the view that the executive branch had the sole power
of recognition was widely accepted.
1. President Washington’s Recognition of France
The French Revolution first presented the question of which part or
parts of the federal government held the constitutional power to recognize foreign powers. Following the overthrow of King Louis XVI, the
Washington Administration had to decide whether to recall its ambassador as European countries were doing, whether to continue the payments
to France’s revolutionary government for war debts it owed to France,
and whether to receive the ambassador sent by that government—
practical questions that effectively also raised the question of whether or
not to recognize the new government of France.54
The decisions made by the Washington Administration would ultimately become a key precedent for claims of a concurrent or even exclusive presidential recognition power. Importantly, however, the focus
within the Washington Administration in resolving these questions was
not on the constitutional power of the President to make these decisions
but rather on the international legal obligations of the United States. In a
recent pair of articles, Professor Robert Reinstein has shown how decision-making within the Washington Administration on this issue was
driven by the aim of strict compliance with international law.55 As set
forth by the theorist Emer de Vattel—a favorite source on international
law for the Founding generation—nations were to “take for their rule the
circumstance of actual possession” in deciding whether to engage in diplomatic relations with new governments.56 This principle of international
54
See Robert J. Reinstein, Executive Power and the Law of Nations in the Washington
Administration, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 373, 422–26 (2012) [hereinafter Reinstein, Executive
Power]; Robert J. Reinstein, Recognition: A Case Study on the Original Understanding of
Executive Power, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 801, 839–40 (2011) [hereinafter Reinstein, Recognition].
55
Reinstein, Executive Power, supra note 54, at 380, 422–28; Reinstein, Recognition, supra note 54, at 839–42.
56
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. IV, § 68 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore,
eds., Tomas Nugent, trans., 2008); see also Reinstein, Recognition, supra note 54, at 839.
Although the Washington Administration viewed international law as requiring recognition
where there was de facto possession, this view may not have accurately reflected the European custom of the time. See Julius Goebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United States
95–96, 98, 114–15 (1915) (arguing that the U.S. approach did not in fact represent existing
international law, though it shaped international law going forward).
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law, as Washington Administration officials understood it, played a key
role in their deliberations. When Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton, who was no fan of the revolutionary government, asked John
Jay for advice on whether there was some basis for limiting the reception of the ambassador sent by the revolutionary government, Jay offered him no support. Instead, Jay emphasized that “they who actually
administer the government of any nation, are by foreign nations to be
regarded as its lawful Rulers” and insisted that it is the “[d]uty . . . of the
United States, strictly to observe that conduct towards all nations, which
the laws of nations prescribe.”57
As these recognition-related questions unfolded over 1792 and 1793,
it is striking how little Washington Administration officials appeared to
reflect on whether the President could constitutionally make recognition
decisions on his own. The first written constitutional justification that I
am aware of occurs in the essays of Pacificus, written anonymously by
Alexander Hamilton some months after the recognition questions were
resolved. Hamilton remarked that “the right of the Executive to receive
ambassadors and other public Ministers . . . . includes that of judging, in
the case of a Revolution of Government in a foreign Country, whether
the new rulers are competent organs of the National Will, and ought to
[be] recognized, or not.”58 One might infer from this argument, along
with the absence of other debate on the issue, that there really was no
constitutional question—that the constitutional right of the President to
make these recognition decisions on his own was so settled in light of
the Receive Ambassadors Clause that there was simply no need to discuss the issue. But this conclusion seems unlikely given the treatment of
the Receive Ambassadors Clause during the debates over the ratification
of the Constitution. At that time, none other than Hamilton described the
clause as “more of a matter of dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the administration of the
government.”59 In light of this, Hamilton’s later treatment of the Receive
57
Draft Proclamation prepared by John Jay, enclosed in Letter from John Jay to Alexander
Hamilton (Apr. 11, 1793), in 14 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 309 (Harold C. Syrett &
Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted); see also Reinstein,
Executive Power, supra note 54, at 426 (discussing this exchange). For a discussion of other
Washington Administration correspondence emphasizing that diplomatic relations should
turn on actual possession, see Reinstein, Executive Power, supra note 54, at 422–23.
58
Pacificus Number I (June 29, 1793), in Pacificus-Helvidus Debate, supra note 30, at 8,
14 (alteration in original).
59
The Federalist No. 69, at 341 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008).
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Ambassadors Clause as a positive source of recognition power seems
suspiciously like a post hoc justification.
The absence of focus on the constitutional question suggests that international law served here as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy. It seems that the Washington Administration officials simply focused
on making sure the United States was obeying international law, as a responsible nation would do, without even initially digesting whether or
not they were the proper actors within the nation to make these decisions. In doing so, however, the Washington Administration established
the important constitutional precedent that the President could make at
least some recognition determinations by himself.
2. The “Sole Organ” Principle and the Birth of the Idea of Exclusive
Presidential Recognition
The recognition of France by the Washington Administration established that Presidents could make recognition decisions on their own, at
least where new governments were concerned, but left open whether the
President’s recognition power was sole or shared with Congress. Over
the next half-century, Presidents made the most important recognition
decisions in conjunction with Congress, but the idea of an exclusive
presidential power of recognition began to arise, due partly to the use of
international law as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation.
This idea tied into the developing principle that the President speaks as
the “sole organ” for the United States as a matter of international law.
In a speech before the House of Representatives in 1800, John Marshall described the President as “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”60 Although Marshall did not specify the basis for this claim, it lies at the
intersection of international law and Lockean theories of executive power. International law at the time required that states maintain a single
“representative authority” with which other states could raise interna60
10 Annals of Cong. 613 (1800) (statement of Rep. Marshall). Precursors include Pacificus Number I (June 29, 1793), in Pacificus-Helvidus Debate, supra note 30, at 11 (describing
the executive branch as “the organ of intercourse between the [United States] and foreign
Nations” (emphasis omitted)); Jefferson’s Opinion on the Powers of the Senate Respecting
Diplomatic Appointments (Apr. 24, 1790), in 16 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 378, 379
(Julian P. Boyd et al. eds, 1961) (asserting that the “transaction of business with foreign nations is Executive altogether”); cf. Act of July 27, 1789, § 1, 1 Stat. 28 (1789) (establishing
the Department of Foreign Affairs to conduct communications with foreign nations according to the President’s orders).
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tional legal concerns.61 Interpreting the Constitution to be in compliance
with this principle of international law, as Marshall and others appear to
have done, the question arose whether Congress or the President served
as this authority. Under the Articles of Confederation, this role necessarily fell to the Continental Congress, but there were strong arguments
in favor of the President having this authority under the Constitution.
Not only did John Locke’s theory of executive power suggest that this
role fell naturally to the executive,62 but in addition, the President was
favored by strong functional arguments—what if an urgent issue came
up and Congress was not in session?—and by the fact that at least some
direct communication between the President and foreign governments
was clearly contemplated by the Receive Ambassadors Clause. These
factors suggested that the President should have some role as the representative of the United States to foreign government, and the international law requirement of a single representative authority elevated the
President to holding this power solely. The President’s role as the “sole
organ” (which numerous constitutional actors since Marshall have ech-

61

Quincy Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations 15 (1922). This representative authority could perhaps have been thought of as the federal government generally, see 1
Op. Att’y Gen. 522 (1852) (“The people of the United States seem to have contemplated the
national government as the sole and exclusive organ of intercourse with foreign nations.”),
but the further requirement under the law of nations that communication between nations
happen between ministers, see Vattel, supra note 56, at bk. 4, § 55, furthered a more specific
understanding of the representative authority as the entity within the government that supervised ministers. See Wright, supra, at 23.
62
See Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 31, at 266–68. Professors Prakash and Ramsey treat
Lockean theories of executive power as the basis of the sole organ doctrine. But international
law has also played an important role, in two respects. First, international law and theories of
executive power, particularly those powers related to foreign affairs, were closely intertwined, with some theorists justifying one by way of the other. E.g., 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *257 (explaining that the king has the treaty-making prerogative because “it
is by the law of nations essential to the goodness of a [treaty] that it be made by the sovereign power”); see Vattel, supra note 56, at bk. 4, § 55 (identifying international law norms
governing communications between nations). At the very least, international law identified
the need for a single representative, even if theories of executive power signaled the actor
that would fill that need. Second, in practice, important actors in American foreign relations
law have rooted the sole organ doctrine primarily in international law. Quincy Wright’s treatise on The Control of American Foreign Relations Power, for example, makes “the requirement of international law that states maintain a definite authority to which foreign states
may complain of violations of international law and from which they may expect satisfaction
on the basis of that law alone” a centerpiece of his entire argument. Wright, supra note 61, at
15.
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oed63) in turn ultimately bolstered arguments for a sole presidential
recognition power and for other presidential foreign affairs powers. It
has been perhaps the most important principle derived from international
law to influence the constitutional separation of powers.
During the decades that followed the Washington Administration,
however, both political branches took a mostly cooperative approach to
the recognition power. James Monroe sought the backing of Congress in
recognizing Latin American countries breaking away from Spain, and
Andrew Jackson accepted a congressional role in the recognition of
Texas as a matter of political desirability (although noting that he reserved comment on the constitutional question).64 From the congressional side, Henry Clay produced a report claiming that recognition could be
accomplished in multiple ways, including exclusively by the President,
by the President and the Senate together, or by Congress.65 This period
of cooperation was perhaps helped by the fact that, at least prior to the
Civil War, the constitutional actors largely deemed themselves as constrained by what the Washington Administration had viewed as the international legal principles governing recognition.66
Yet hints of an exclusive presidential power of recognition were
emerging. Secretaries of State John Quincy Adams and William Seward
asserted that the recognition power lay exclusively with the President,67
63
The Senate acknowledged this proposition early on, see S. Foreign Relations Comm.,
56th Cong., Rep. of Feb. 15, 1816, reprinted in 6 Compilation of Reports of Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 1789–1901, at 21 (1901) (“The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign nations.”), and the Supreme Court famously embraced it in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319 (1936).
64
President Monroe, Message to Congress of Mar. 8, 1822, in 1 Moore, supra note 53, at
245; President Jackson, Message to Congress of Dec. 21, 1836, in id. at 99.
65
See Julius Goebel, Jr., The Recognition Policy of the United States 149–51 (1915)
(quoting Clay’s report and discussing the context at length).
66
See supra notes 55–57 (describing the Washington Administration view); Goebel, supra
note 56, at 113–15, 171–72 (claiming that there was faithful adherence of the United States
to this approach until the Civil War, in which the United States was understandably resistant
to de facto possession giving rise to recognition). But see Robert Reinstein, Slavery, Executive Power and International Law: The Haitian Revolution and American Constitutionalism,
53 Am. J. Legal Hist. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 65–71, 87–92) (on file with author)
(arguing that the failure of U.S. presidents to recognize Haiti as the nineteenth century unfolded is a counterexample to Goebel’s claim).
67
John Quincy Adams, Memoirs 205–06 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1875); Letter from
William H. Seward, Sec’y of State, to William L. Dayton, U.S. Minister to France (Apr. 7,
1864), in The American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events of the Year
1864, at 528 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1865). But see H.R. Rep. No. 38-129, at 11
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and Presidents increasingly emphasized their “sole organ” power. In one
notable instance, Ulysses S. Grant vetoed two trivial joint resolutions by
Congress—resolutions that simply responded to congratulations sent by
foreign nations—on the ground that “[t]he Constitution of the United
States, following the established usage of nations, has indicated the
President as the agent to represent the national sovereignty in its intercourse with foreign powers.”68 This language suggests that international
law, or at least international custom, was serving as a direct principle of
constitutional interpretation with regard to the power to deal with other
states.
3. The Recognition of Cuba as a Separation-of-Powers Debate
International law played a role in perhaps the sharpest exchange between Congress and the executive branch over recognition during the
nineteenth century—the debate over whether and when to recognize Cuba during its war of independence. In December 1896, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to send a resolution to the floor of the
Senate recognizing Cuba as independent. This decision came well before
the President was ready to recognize Cuba and prompted an immediate,
angry rebuttal by Secretary of State Richard Olney. “The power to recognize the so-called Republic of Cuba as an independent State,” Olney
claimed, “rest[s] exclusively with the Executive.”69 His remarks in turn
provoked outrage among Senators, and helped fuel a lengthy floor debate over the constitutional allocation of the recognition power. Senators
on both sides of the issue drew on international law in their constitutional interpretation.

(1864) (disagreeing with Seward’s assertions of an exclusive presidential recognition power).
68
Ulysses S. Grant, Veto Message of Jan. 26, 1877, in Veto Messages of the President of
the United States with the Action of Congress Thereon 407 (Washington, D.C., Government
Printing Office 1886) (emphasis added).
69
Olney Opposes Recognition of Cuba by America, Norfolk Virginian, Dec. 20, 1896, at
1. Two years later, the Solicitor of the State Department published a law review article that
took a somewhat more nuanced view of the issue. He emphasized that “while the faculty of
recognition depends on the internal public law of a State, yet in the forum of international
law its exercise is considered as usually an executive function.” W. L. Penfield, Recognition
of a New State—Is It an Executive Function?, 32 Am. L. Rev. 390, 390 (1898); see also id.
at 396. His ultimate conclusion, however, was that since, in his view, international law did
not require any particular style of recognition, a statute passed by Congress and signed by
the President would constitute recognition. See id. at 408.
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In asserting a congressional power of recognition, Senator Augustus
Bacon of Florida relied on international law’s status as domestic law in
the United States. Bacon emphasized that “[i]nternational law is a part of
the law of this land and will be administered by the courts of this country, both Federal and State, without any distinct legal enactment either
by Congress or by any State government.”70 Because international law is
domestic law, he reasoned, Congress, as the body in charge of making
domestic law, should have the responsibility for the international legal
decisions such as recognition.71 Bacon’s structural argument was met
with skepticism, however, as other Senators pointed out that his reasoning suggested that only Congress should make recognition decisions,
while past practice (including the Washington Administration’s recognition of France) suggested that the President had at least a concurrent
power to do so.72
More powerfully, Senator Eugene Hale of Maine used international
law as a principle of constitutional interpretation in arguing for a sole
presidential recognition power. In essence, he argued on the floor and in
a written memorandum that the sole organ doctrine meant that the constitutional power of recognition lay with the President:
Resolutions of . . . legislative departments upon diplomatic matters
have no status in international law. In the department of international
law, therefore, properly speaking, a congressional recognition of belligerency or independence would be a nullity. . . . Congress can help
the Cuban insurgents by legislation in many ways, but it cannot help
them legitimately by mere declarations, or by attempts to engage in
diplomatic negotiations, if our interpretation of the Constitution is correct.73

70

29 Cong. Rec. 747 (1897) (statement of Sen. Bacon). This language bears a striking resemblance to the Supreme Court’s contemporary assertion that “[i]nternational law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 143 (1895).
71
29 Cong. Rec. 747 (1897) (statement of Sen. Bacon); see also id. at 746.
72
Id. at 747–49 (exchanges between Sens. Bacon, Gray, and Platt).
73
29 Cong. Rec. 670 (1987), also available as S. Doc. No. 54-56 (1987). There is a touch
of originalism in Senator Hale’s argument, as he asserts that “[a]ll of these considerations
were familiar to the statesmen who framed the Federal Constitution,” but the argument is not
framed as a solely originalist one. Id. In addition to Senator Hale, Senator John Morgan of
Alabama also relied on international law in interpreting the Constitution to give the President
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Ultimately, the showdown over the recognition of Cuba turned into a
compromise. The Senate did not pass this resolution, and just over a year
later, President McKinley and Congress agreed on a resolution acknowledging the “people of the island of Cuba” as “free and independent”—
language which did not explicitly recognize Cuba but came carefully
close to doing so.74 The arguments made by Senator Hale, however,
found twentieth-century supporters and helped move the practice towards an exclusive presidential power of recognition.
4. Exclusive Presidential Recognition in the Twentieth Century
The theory of exclusive presidential recognition power crystallized as
the twentieth century unfolded. During this period, scholars and constitutional actors followed Senator Hale in relying on international law as a
principle of constitutional interpretation supporting an exclusive presidential recognition power.
The importance of international law as a background principle for interpreting the constitutional allocation of recognition powers is apparent
in the writings of two particularly influential scholars of foreign affairs
powers: Edwin Corwin and Philip Quincy Wright. In concluding in 1917
that the recognition power lay only with the President—acting alone or
in conjunction with the Senate—Corwin relied on Senator Hale’s argument that “‘[r]esolutions of . . . legislative departments upon diplomatic
matters have no status in international law.’”75 Quincy Wright similarly
defended an exclusive presidential recognition power based on the President’s role as the representative organ for the United States under inter-

the recognition power as a “mere piece of diplomatic authority which he derives under the
law of nations, which are recognized in the Constitution.” 29 Cong. Rec. 684 (1897) (statement of Sen. Morgan).
74
15 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of Presidents,
1789–1897, at 6448 (New York, Bureau of National Literature, Inc. 1897); see also Senate
Discusses Cuba, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1898, at 3 (noting that a version of the resolution that
would explicitly have recognized Cuba did not pass). The joint resolution also authorized the
President to use force against Spain to further Cuban independence, see id., and later defenders of an exclusive presidential power of recognition would argue that this resolution was an
authorization of intervention only, not an act of recognition. E.g., Wright, supra note 61, at
271.
75
Edwin S. Corwin, The President’s Control of Foreign Relations 80 (1917) (quoting Senator Hale’s memorandum); see also id. at 82 (alluding again to the fact that Congress lacked
the power to communicate as a matter of international law on behalf of the United States).
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national law.76 Significantly, Wright saw international law not only as
the basis for a presidential power of recognition, but also as a potential
constraint on this power. More specifically, he suggested that the President’s recognition powers might be constitutionally limited to situations
where recognition was in fact warranted by international law—for example, to situations where the government to be recognized did in fact
have territorial control.77
Like Corwin and Quincy Wright, the Supreme Court came to rely on
the sole organ doctrine in justifying the President’s recognition powers.
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court considered whether
President Franklin Roosevelt had the power to make an executive
agreement ancillary to his sole decision to recognize the Soviet Union
and its communist government. In upholding the President’s actions as
within his constitutional powers, the Court emphasized his “authority to
speak as the sole organ of that government.”78
Belmont did not mention any role for Congress in recognition, though
it did not expressly reject such a role either. Eventually, however, the
Supreme Court would go further in dicta in Banco National de Cuba v.
Sabbatino to suggest that the recognition power is “exclusively a function of the Executive.”79 The Court did not further explain this dicta,
simply making this statement in passing without any citation. With the
development of this dicta, however, those seeking to justify the President’s sole recognition power no longer needed to rely directly on international law as a background principle of constitutional interpretation.
Instead, they could simply cite this dicta as demonstrating that constitutional provisions such as the Receive Ambassador Clause entrusted the
recognition power to the President.80 The role that international law had

76

See Wright, supra note 61, at 268; see also id. at 273 (quoting Senator Hale for the
proposition that legislative pronouncements lack status under international law).
77
Id. at 269–70.
78
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
79
376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964). This same shift can be seen from the Restatement (Second) of
Foreign Relations Law, which described the President as having the recognition power without expressly discussing whether Congress had a concurrent recognition power, to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which treats the President’s recognition power
as exclusive. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 106(2) (1965); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 204 (1987).
80
E.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 204 cmt. a
& reporters’ note 1 (1987).
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played in shaping the constitutional allocation of the recognition powers
thus faded into obscurity.
B. War Powers
The text of the Constitution gives Congress the power to “declare
War,”81 and both its drafting history and the practice of the first Presidents indicates an original understanding that congressional authorization was needed for the United States to initiate hostilities. The reality
today is far different. Presidents now consider themselves constitutionally entitled to launch significant attacks on other countries without congressional authorization, provided that doing so furthers what they consider to be the interests of the United States.
As a legal matter, Office of Legal Counsel memoranda now justify
this shift by reference to the historical gloss. A close look at the past
practices that underlie this gloss, however, reveals that international law
has helped shape the constitutional distribution of war powers in all
three of the ways discussed in Part I—as an input for other principles of
constitutional interpretation, as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation, and as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy.82 As Edwin Corwin once observed, “from the first it has devolved upon [the
President] to protect American rights and to discharge American duties
under the law of nations; and, as commonly happens, the path of duty
became in time a road to power.”83 Among other practices, international

81

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
I focus here only on international law’s role in shaping decisions to use force in the first
place. International law has also played an important role in shaping the constitutional allocation of war powers with regard to the conduct of existing hostilities. As early as Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), the Supreme Court used international law in
interpreting the constitutional scope of the President’s powers to conduct hostilities. Id. at
123–29 (concluding that, in the absence of specific congressional authorization, the President did not have the constitutional power to seize enemy property within the United States
in violation of a “modern” rule of international law). Perhaps because the Supreme Court has
weighed in more frequently on the separation of powers with regard to the conduct of hostilities than with regard to the other areas of foreign relations law explored in this Article, existing scholarship has already explored how international law has helped shape the constitutional allocation of powers with regard to the conduct of hostilities. See supra note 47.
83
Corwin, supra note 31, at 236 (suggesting that the Take Care Clause helped bolster this
growth in presidential power); see also id. at 240–41 (“Thanks to the same capacity to base
action directly on his own reading of international law . . . the President has been able to
gather to himself powers with respect to warmaking which ill accord with the specific delegation in the Constitution of the war-declaring power to Congress.”).
82
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law helped justify the many minor engagements undertaken solely under
presidential authority, as well as more major commitments undertaken
by Presidents acting without Congress in asserted responses to treaty
commitments of the United States.
1. Minor Engagements
Starting early in the nineteenth century, U.S. armed forces periodically carried out small-scale attacks without congressional authorization.
For purposes of constitutional law, the most important of these attacks
was probably the bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua by the U.S. naval ship Cyane, nominally in retaliation for an unpunished assault on an
American diplomat.84 The bombardment of Greytown is significant both
because it was a comparatively substantial use of force—the Cyane destroyed the town—and because it gave rise to a rare court decision on
presidential authority to use force. Written by Supreme Court Justice
Samuel Nelson riding circuit, Durand v. Hollins is a case that still appears in leading textbooks covering the constitutional division of war
powers.85
In deciding that the President had the constitutional power to authorize the bombardment of Greytown, Justice Nelson observed that:
As the executive head of the nation, the president is made the only legitimate organ of the general government, to open and carry on correspondence or negotiations with foreign nations, in matters concerning
the interests of the country or of its citizens. It is to him, also, the citizens abroad must look for protection of person and of property, and
for the faithful execution of the laws existing and intended for their
protection.86

This passage hints at two principles of international law. One—the
one directly relevant to the case—is the principle that nations are responsible for protecting their citizens from abuse and seeking reparations or revenge for injuries to them.87 But international law does not di84

For a detailed account, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Descent into
the Maelstrom, 1829–1861, at 117–21 (2005).
85
8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186); see also, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law 232–33 (2011) (including this case).
86
Durand, 8 F. Cas at 112.
87
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. II, § 71 (“Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly
offends the state, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the sovereign of the latter should
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rectly speak to what branch of government bears responsibility for fulfilling this responsibility. To attribute this responsibility to the President,
Justice Nelson draws an analogy to another principle of international
law—the sole organ doctrine—reasoning that because the President acts
as the sole organ under international law, he must also be responsible for
fulfilling the international legal role of protecting U.S. citizens.88
In Durand, Justice Nelson also noted that Greytown was “an irresponsible and marauding community.”89 Although he did not elaborate
on this point, there is an implication that it is appropriate for the President to independently authorize the use of force against such communities, as opposed to more responsible states. International law authorized
the punishment of “mischievous” nations,90 and in any event such communities might be less akin to nations than to pirates, who were understood to be the enemy of all. These international legal principles in turn
might influence the constitutional allocation of powers, either by suggesting that attacks on such communities did not amount to “war” or because the President would be independently authorized to conduct these
attacks under his increasingly recognized role as the constitutional enforcer of international law.
Although Durand gives only a hint of these arguments, they were
made more expressly by constitutional actors in the political branches in
relation to the bombardment of Greytown. President Franklin Pierce likened Greytown to a “piratical resort of outlaws” and emphasized that it
“did not profess to belong to any regular government, and had, in fact,
no recognized dependence on or connection with anyone to which the
United States or their injured citizens might apply for redress or which
could be held responsible in any way for the outrages committed.”91 In a
debate in the Senate a few years later, Senator Jacob Collamer asserted
that while the President might have the constitutional power to use force

avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make full reparation.”).
88
For a discussion of some other instances where the international legal principle of protecting or avenging one’s citizens is used to bolster the President’s power to authorize the
use of aggressive force in the nineteenth century, see Currie, supra note 84, at 122–23.
89
8 F. Cas. at 112.
90
Vattel, supra note 87, at bk II, § 70.
91
Franklin Pierce, Message to Congress of Dec. 4, 1854, in 5 Richardson, supra note 74, at
282; see also Currie, supra note 84, at 119–21 (noting the constitutional implications). President Buchanan would later back away from his predecessor’s justification of the attack. See
Louis Fisher, The War Power: Original and Contemporary 20 (2009).
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against “barbarous and uncivilized people” like the inhabitants of Greytown, he could not do so “in relation to a civilized people, a people with
whom we have reciprocated diplomatic relations.”92
International law thus provided a constitutionally significant distinction regarding what communities the President could use force against
without the need for congressional authorization. This distinction mattered beyond Greytown and can be found in the thinking of constitutional actors as late as President William Howard Taft. After observing that
congressional authorization is only needed in “the case of a war of aggression” against a foreign country, he went on to remark that:
[W]hat constitutes an act of war [as a constitutional matter] . . . is
sometimes a nice question of law and fact. It really seems to differ
with the character of the nation whose relations with the United States
are affected. The unstable condition as to law and order of some of the
Central American republics creates different rules of international law
from those that obtain in governments that can be depended upon to
maintain their own peace and order.”93

In essence, Taft used an evolving understanding of international law
as an input for understanding the textual meaning of “war” in the Constitution. His approach justified the independent use of force by the President in many contexts, but still required congressional authorization to
initiate hostilities against stable countries.
Important as these international-law-based distinctions may have
been, however, they would ultimately get swallowed up by a more expansive understanding of presidential war powers—one which used the
precedents created in line with these distinctions without recognizing
their importance. One common approach taken by twentieth-century
supporters of broad presidential war powers was to simply list all prior
independent presidential uses of force without discussing the justifications given for them. In 1941, for example, Senator Connally of Texas
offered up a list of “85 incidents” of presidential authorizations of mili-

92
Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 1727 (1858). For another example, see Currie, supra
note 84, at 115, 120 n.34 (noting that President Tyler viewed congressional authorization as
needed for military intervention to protect American civilians, provided that the intervention
would be “agst [sic] a civilized Nation”).
93
William Howard Taft, The Presidency: Its Duties, Its Powers, Its Opportunities, and Its
Limitations 86 (1916).
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tary missions abroad without congressional authorization94 in the course
of arguing that, prior to the U.S. entry into World War II, the President
had the constitutional authority to send thousands of U.S. troops to Iceland to repel any German threat there. Senator Connally’s list included
mostly minor uses of force, typically against non-state communities or
the Central American countries considered distinctive for international
law purposes by Taft. One entry reads, “Cuba 1823: [t]o pursue and
break up an establishment of pirates,” and another, “Fiji Islands 1840:
[t]o punish natives for an attack upon Americans.”95 But rather than considering the nuances of these practices, Senator Connally offered them
up as wholesale endorsements of presidential power to use force abroad
on behalf of U.S. interests. Such simplified aggregations would later be
embraced by executive branch officials seeking to justify unilateral presidential uses of force.
2. Treaties as a Basis for Presidential Uses of Force
Treaties have helped enhance the President’s war powers vis-à-vis
Congress in three main ways. First, there is a longstanding constitutional
debate about whether the President can use force without congressional
approval that he would otherwise need where treaty commitments obligate or, more commonly, authorize this use of force. The more widely
accepted view today is that he cannot, but past precedents going the other way have informed the current scope of the President’s war powers.
Second, where treaties authorize U.S. action, Presidents can use this fact
as an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy that bolsters their arguments in favor of the use of force. Third, in its early days, the U.N.
Charter was deemed by some constitutional actors to influence the constitutional allocation of power between the President and Congress not
only in the two ways just suggested, but also by reshaping the international law of war.
The relationship between the congressional power to declare war and
the treaty power shared by the President and the Senate hinges on
whether congressional authorization for the use of force is needed where
a treaty commits or authorizes the United States to go to war under cer-

94
87 Cong. Rec. 5930–31 (1941); see also id. at 5929 (making clear that the list focuses on
presidential actions not specifically authorized by Congress).
95
Id. at 5930.
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tain conditions and these conditions have been satisfied.96 These questions first arose very early in U.S. constitutional history,97 but to date
they have appeared most dramatically in relation to the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
In committing U.S. troops to the Korean War without congressional
authorization, President Truman relied heavily on the fact that, in response to North Korea’s attack, the U.N. Security Council had voted to
recommend that Member States “furnish such assistance to [South Korea] as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.”98 The executive branch’s doctrinal
use of the Security Council Resolution was two-fold. First, executive
branch officials and supporters argued that, as a matter of constitutional
doctrine, the Security Council Resolution removed any need for congressional authorization. The State Department memorandum justifying
the intervention argued that the President was authorized to carry out the
Security Council’s recommendation under his Take Care Clause power
and that doing so was a “paramount” interest of the United States.99 Second, congressional supporters claimed that the Security Council Resolution had the effect of making the intervention a “police operation” rather
than a “war” within the meaning of the Constitution100—in effect arguing, as President Taft had done decades earlier, that evolving international law shapes the meaning of “war” for constitutional purposes. But

96
A precedential question is whether the United States can enter into such treaties in the
first place. While this issue has been debated, see, e.g., 1 Westel Woodbury Willoughby, The
Constitutional Law of the United States § 290 (1929), in practice U.S. treaties have done so.
One Senate Foreign Relations Committee report has suggested that mutual defense and other
such treaties should at least “implicitly” reserve a right for the United States to decide
whether to act militarily, in order to preserve a role for the House of Representatives in
warmaking. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 95-12, at 74 (1978).
97
See Wright, supra note 61, at 227; Corwin, supra note 75, at 158–63. For a discussion of
how this argument was used to justify President Roosevelt’s intervention in Cuba in 1906
under the Platt Amendment, see Taft, supra note 93, at 74–76.
98
S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950).
99
Dep’t of State, Memorandum of July 3, 1950, reprinted in H. Rep. No. 81-2495, at 61,
65–67 (1950). The memorandum also argued that the intervention lay within the President’s
sole authority based on the numerous nineteenth-century presidential uses of force, using the
reasoning discussed supra note 94 and accompanying text. Id. at 64–65, 67–68.
100
96 Cong. Rec. 9541 (1950) (statement of Sen. Flanders); see also Robert F. Turner,
Truman, Korea, and the Constitution: Debunking the “Imperial President” Myth, 19 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 533, 576 (1996) (discussing the characterization of the Korean War as a
“police action” by congressional supporters immediately following the Security Council
Resolution and describing how President Truman ultimately appropriated this language).
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these arguments all had weak points. Importantly, the Security Council
had not undertaken action directly nor had it required anything of Member States. Instead, it had simply recommended that Member States take
action—facts which weakened the Take Care Clause argument because
it meant the United States had no international legal obligation to carry
out the Security Council mandate and which weakened the “police action” argument because it meant that for all practical purposes the response would come from individual states rather than directly from a
centralized international authority. Moreover, the legislative history behind the approval of the U.N. Charter in the Senate and of its implementing legislation in Congress more generally indicated a congressional assumption that further congressional action would occur before the
United States used force on behalf of the Security Council.101
But while the doctrinal arguments were weak, the extra-constitutional
legitimacy conveyed by the Security Council Resolution was strong. At
least initially, members of Congress were nearly unanimous in applauding the intervention in Korea102—and while some of this approval rested
on anti-communist fervor, much of it also rested on a desire to bolster
the recently created United Nations.103 Senator Ralph Flanders, for example, emphasized that he did not think the President had the power to
initiate such a use of force under “ordinary circumstances,” but that the
use of force here “gets its justification from the preservation of the usefulness and very existence of the United Nations.”104 Majority Leader

101

In particular, Congress assumed that there would be a further agreement with the United Nations, approved by the Senate or Congress, whereby the United States placed a certain
number of troops at the Security Council’s disposal. The President would then be able to authorize use of these troops, but any additional troop use would need further congressional
approval. This agreement, however, was never made. See Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 74, 77–81 (1991). But
see Turner, supra note 100, at 559–63 (arguing that even in the absence of the additional
agreement, the President has the constitutional authority to commit troops on behalf of the
United States).
102
Turner, supra note 100, at 568–70.
103
E.g., 96 Cong. Rec. 9539 (1950) (statement of Sen. Knowland) (expressing anticommunist views); id. at 9540 (statement of Sen. Stennis) (voicing pride that “we are operating at this time through the United Nations”); id. at 9543 (statement of Sen. Saltonstall)
(“We are in Korea because under the United Nations Charter . . . we are attempting to keep
peace.”); id. at 9544 (statement of Sen. Connally) (noting “serious obligations resting upon
us as a nation, because of our plighted faith to support the United Nations”).
104
96 Cong. Rec. 9541 (1950).
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Scott Lucas viewed the Security Council Resolution as “a fact that cannot be stressed too much.”105
Although the constitutionality of Truman’s intervention in Korea remains doubtful today, in practice the executive branch has since used
similar reasoning in justifying other interventions, including the war in
Vietnam. The State Department memorandum defending the legality of
the President’s intervention there relied on three independent arguments
in concluding that there was “no question” as to the constitutionality of
his actions.106 One of these arguments relied on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (“SEATO”).107 Under this treaty, members
agreed to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with [their]
constitutional processes,” and the State Department rather dubiously
read this language as implying that the President could undertake whatever actions he deemed necessary to fulfill this obligation for the United
States.108 This reasoning closely resembles that used with regard to the
Korean War, since in both cases the State Department considered a U.S.
treaty obligation to increase the President’s independent war powers.
As importantly, however, the State Department’s justification for the
Vietnam War reveals how opportunistically prior precedents like the
Korean War can be used. As discussed above, the defenses of President
Truman’s intervention in Korea relied heavily on the U.N. Security
Council Resolution not simply because the U.N. Charter was a treaty
commitment of the United States, but also because the U.N. Charter was
seen as a transformative treaty commitment that conveyed powerful extra-constitutional legitimacy and altered the meaning of war in international law in ways that had constitutional ramifications. In Vietnam,
however, there was no supportive Security Council Resolution. One
might think that the State Department memorandum would have noted
these comparative points of weakness, but its constitutional discussion

105

Id. at 9542.
See Dep’t of State Memorandum of Mar. 4, 1966, reprinted in 112 Cong. Rec. 5504–09
(1966).
107
See generally id. at 5508. In addition to relying on the SEATO Treaty, the memorandum argued (1) that the President had the independent power to commit U.S. troops to Vietnam as commander-in-chief (citing the Korean War, among others, as a precedent and also
relying on the dubious numeric reasoning discussed supra note 94 and accompanying text)
and (2) that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution constituted congressional authorization. See id.at
5507–09.
108
Id. at 5508 (acknowledging but essentially ignoring evidence from the ratification history that a land army would not be used by the President for this purpose).
106
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made scant mention of them.109 Instead, the comparisons drawn by the
State Department only emphasized the constitutional strengths of the
Vietnam intervention compared to Korea:
In the Korean conflict, where large-scale hostilities were conducted
with an American troop participation of a quarter of a million men, no
declaration of war was made by the Congress. The President acted on
the basis of his constitutional responsibilities. While the Security
Council, under a treaty of this country—the United Nations Charter—
recommended assistance to the Republic of Korea against the Communist armed attack, the United States had no treaty commitment at
that time obligating us to join in the defense of South Korea. In the
case of South Vietnam we have the obligation of the SEATO Treaty
and clear expressions of congressional support. If the President could
act in Korea without a declaration of war, a fortiori he is empowered
to do so now in Vietnam.110

This discussion demonstrates just how easily past practices can be
used to justify still more expansive practices down the road. The State
Department memorandum ignores or downplays factors that were important to President Truman’s constitutional war powers at the time of
the Korean intervention—the Security Council Resolution, the paramount interest in having the United Nations be a success, the support of
most members of Congress—in favor of a narrative of unbounded, unilateral presidential action. This fluid use of the Korean War precedent,
like the use of minor nineteenth-century engagements, helped develop
the current, extraordinarily broad understanding of the President’s war
powers.
C. Sole Executive Agreements
The text of the Constitution provides only one clear way for the United States to make international agreements. This is the Treaty Clause,
which gives the President the power to make treaties with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.111 Today, however, the President enters into many international agreements under his own authority. Known
109

Id. at 5507–09. The memorandum did discuss the absence of a Security Council Resolution in the section addressing the intervention’s legality under international law. Id. at
5505–06.
110
Id. at 5509.
111
U.S. Const. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
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as sole executive agreements, these tend to be more modest international
legal commitments than treaties approved through the Treaty Clause, but
they still serve as a substantial source of presidential foreign affairs
powers.112
As with recognition powers and war powers, international law has
bolstered the President’s power to make sole executive agreements.113
Historically, constitutional actors used international law in all three of
the ways described in Part I in determining and defending these increased powers. More specifically, international law helped justify the
President’s power to enter into the two types of sole executive agreements that form the roots of this power: first, agreements settling claims
between U.S. nationals and foreign nations; and second, temporary
agreements, known as modi vivendi, with other nations pending more
permanent arrangements. As with recognition (though in a less pronounced way), the sole organ doctrine played a part in these developments, and so did several other principles of international law.
1. Claims Settlement Agreements
Claims settlement agreements are a well-established type of sole executive agreements and have done the most to establish the President’s
power to enter into sole executive agreements. These agreements initially settled the claims of U.S. citizens against foreign nations, though they
have now come to have broader scopes.114 The first involved the Wilmington Packet, a privately owned American ship that was seized by a
Dutch privateer in a way that the United States believed violated a treaty
between the Netherlands and the United States. In 1799, the U.S. diplomat posted to the Netherlands entered into an agreement with his Dutch

112

For discussions of the reach of sole executive agreements, see, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 133 (1998); Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1573 (2007).
113
I focus here only on sole executive agreements, but international law has also strengthened the President’s hand in other forms of international agreements. For example, the sole
organ doctrine helped persuade the Senate to abdicate a formal pre-negotiation role with regard to treaties made through the Treaty Clause, see S. Foreign Relations Comm., 14th
Cong., Rep. of Feb. 15, 1816 (1st Sess. 1816), though the best evidence suggests that the
Framers intended the Senate to play both pre-negotiation and post-negotiation roles, see Jean
Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 247, 256–58 (2012).
114
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by the
President, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 1 (2003). Historically, sovereign immunity principles made it
difficult or impossible for private citizens to pursue these claims on their own. Id. at 21.
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counterpart whereby the Dutch government paid a sum of money to the
United States on behalf of the American owners of the cargo and in return was released of all claims.115 From the perspective of foreign relations law, the most interesting thing about the settlement process is the
lack of evidence suggesting that the U.S. executive branch officials involved ever considered whether they had the constitutional power to
make the agreement.116 They seem to have simply assumed that they had
this power—an assumption which presumably was influenced as a matter of extra-constitutional legitimacy by the fact that, as a matter of international law, this was the kind of thing that foreign offices did for
their citizens.
As the State Department undertook more claims settlement agreements, however, the constitutional justifications began to be formally
developed. These justifications relied on international law as a principle
of constitutional interpretation. Most prominently, constitutional actors
cited the sole organ doctrine, which, as discussed earlier, is grounded in
a mix of international law and perceptions of executive power. In 1835,
Andrew Jackson vetoed an act that would have authorized the Secretary
of State to settle claims of American citizens with Sicily and Naples for
less than the full amount, on the ground that the “Executive [already]
has competent authority to negotiate about it for them with a foreign
government—an authority Congress can not constitutionally abridge or
increase.”117 When the question of the President’s power to enter into
claims settlement agreements ultimately reached the courts, they would
similarly emphasize the sole organ doctrine and the appropriateness, as a
matter of international law, that claims settlement be handled by the
State Department.118
115
See Letter from William Vans Murray to U.S. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering
(Dec. 23, 1799), in 5 Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America
1099 (Hunter Miller ed., 1937) [hereinafter Miller].
116
There is no mention of the constitutional question, for example, in the lengthy compilation of documents in Miller, supra note 115, at 1075–1103, related to the Wilmington Packet.
117
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message to the Senate (Mar. 3, 1835), in 3 Richardson, supra
note 74, at 146.
118
E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 683 (1981) (quoting language from
Ozanic); Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The continued mutual
amity between the nation and other powers again and again depends upon a satisfactory
compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such compromises has existed
from the earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of all civilized nations.”);
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (relying on the “sole organ” doctrine);
see also Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presi-
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In addition to the sole organ doctrine, constitutional actors also derived the President’s power to enter into claims settlement agreements
from the international legal responsibility of nations to look after the interests of their citizens—a responsibility that, as discussed earlier, was
understood to lie primarily with the executive. “In making [claims settlement agreements],” explained a Department of State Memorandum in
1922, “the Executive has taken appropriate steps to obtain redress for infringement of rights of American citizens under treaties and under international law.”119
These two international legal doctrines helped develop the President’s
constitutional power to enter into claims settlement agreements. In addition, textualists have come to use international law as an input for understanding the meaning of the word “treaties” in the Treaty Clause in a
way that also supports this presidential power. Professor Michael Ramsey, for example, has argued that the word “treaties” is meant to invoke
a distinction made by Vattel and other eighteenth-century international
legal theorists between different types of international agreements.120
Vattel used “treaties” to refer to particularly important international
agreements, whereas “agreements” referred to less significant undertakings.121 International law thus provides a textualist basis for finding some
international agreements made outside the Treaty Clause by the President to be constitutional, but also for requiring that more significant international commitments go through the Treaty Clause.122 This use of in-

dential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: Part I, 54 Yale L.J.
181, 249–50 (1945) (attributing claims settlement power to the sole organ doctrine); id. at
268 (“International law and practice provide that claims by citizens of one government
against another government may be prosecuted only through the foreign office of the claimant’s government.”).
119
Memorandum of the Solicitor for the Department of State (Nielsen), sent to Senator
Lodge by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) (Aug. 23, 1922), quoted in 5 Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of International Law 390 (1943); see also James F. Barnett, International Agreements Without the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 15 Yale L.J. 63, 76
(1905) (explaining, in a section on claims settlement agreements, how “[o]ne of the principal
duties of the department of state relates to the protection of American citizens abroad”).
120
Ramsey, supra note 112, at 165–71. The Supreme Court drew a similar textualist distinction between “Treaties” for purposes of the Treaty Clause and “Agreements or Compacts” for purposes of the State Compacts Clause as far back as Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.
540, 571–72 (1840), though this decision related to vertical separation of powers rather than
to their horizontal separation.
121
Ramsey, supra note 112, at 165–71 (discussing the issue with much more nuance).
122
See id. at 204 (making this argument in the claims settlement context). To the contrary,
however, scholars who think the meaning of “treaties” in the Constitution should be under-
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ternational law, however, may be historically less important than the uses of the sole organ doctrine and the responsibility for the protection of
American citizens in the development of the President’s claim settlement powers, however, as there is little evidence that the executive actually relied on it during the formative periods.
2. Modi Vivendi
A modus vivendi is “an arrangement of a temporary and provisional
nature concluded between . . . subjects of international law which gives
rise to binding obligations on the parties.”123 As with claim settlement
agreements, it came to be accepted that Presidents could enter into modi
vivendi under their sole constitutional powers. Some modi vivendi were
procedural in nature, setting forth the ground rules that would govern a
treaty negotiation. The President’s authority to enter into these was accepted as flowing from his sole organ power, but constitutional actors
have also used this power to justify other more substantive modi vivendi,
such as provisional agreements on boundary disputes or fishing rights
pending their final resolutions.124
One particularly bold use of a modus vivendi was made by Theodore
Roosevelt with the Dominican Republic. He had negotiated a treaty with
the Dominican Republic that would, among other things, place the United States in charge of collecting the Dominican Republic’s customs revenue.125 When the Senate did not immediately have the votes needed for
its advice and consent, President Roosevelt simply arranged a modus vistood in light of current rather than eighteenth-century international law have argued that, in
light of developments in international law, important international commitments can be
“agreements” rather than “treaties” and that this is relevant for constitutional purposes. E.g.,
McDougal & Lans, supra note 118, at 195–97, 318–28.
123
Walter Rudolf, Modus Vivendi, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 442–44
(Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997).
124
Memorandum from Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State to W.A.F. Ekengren,
Swedish Charge d’Affaires ad interim (Mar. 22, 1907), quoted in 5 Hackworth, supra note
119, at 392 (“The executive department of the government is confided the general authority
over foreign intercourse, and, as a necessary incident to such authority, the executive possesses a large and undefined power to enter into compacts and agreements relating to almost
every topic properly subject to international negotiation. A typical illustration of an agreement within the competence of the Executive . . . is the ordinary case of a modus vivendi.”);
cf. Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870) (deeming the power to make a modus vivendi over a boundary to be “a necessary incident to every national government” and
further stating that it “inheres where the executive power is vested”).
125
For a detailed discussion, see W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate 212–29
(1933).
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vendi that effectively implemented the customs-collections provisions of
the treaty.126 This sharply reduced the relevance of the Senate’s review
of the treaty and, as Roosevelt well knew, was a move of dubious constitutionality.127 During the angry debate that followed in the Senate, President Roosevelt’s chief defender, Senator John Spooner of Wisconsin,
had very little to offer in the way of constitutional justifications.128 One
of his few arguments, however, drew upon international legal principles.
He claimed that the modus vivendi was appropriate because the pending
treaty created an “obligation of honor” upon both parties to act in a way
that would respect the terms of the future treaty.129 Although Spooner
did not elaborate on this “obligation of honor,” it invokes an international legal principle that nations owe some duties to each other regarding a
treaty from the time a treaty is signed, not just after it is ratified.130
Spooner then argued that this obligation meant that the “President not
only had a constitutional right to [enter into the modus vivendi], but it
was his duty . . . . to this body where the treaty is pending to do it.”131
Spooner’s argument is yet another example of the use of international
law as a background principle of constitutional interpretation, albeit a
particularly unconvincing and opportunistic one.
Although less significant than claims settlement agreements, modi vivendi have proved important to constitutional justifications of the President’s power to enter into sole executive agreements more generally.
Almost all defenses of this presidential power have relied heavily on the
past practice of one or both of claims settlement agreements and modi
vivendi.132 The role that international legal principles like the sole organ
126

Id. at 222–23.
Roosevelt later observed that “[t]he Constitution did not explicitly give me the power to
bring about [the modus vivendi]. But the Constitution did not forbid my doing what I did. I
put the agreement into effect, and I continued its execution for two years before the Senate
acted . . . .” Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography 524 (1916).
128
See 40. Cong. Rec. 1423–31 (1906).
129
Id. at 1425–26.
130
In the eighteenth century, this doctrine was so strong that nations were understood to be
obligated to ratify treaties that they signed, see Galbraith, supra note 113, at 265–68. Today,
vestiges of this doctrine remain in the principle that signatories to a treaty are obliged not to
take acts that would defeat its “object and purpose” prior to its entry into force. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
131
40. Cong. Rec. 1426 (1906).
132
See, e.g., George Sutherland, Constitutional Power and World Affairs 120–21 (1919);
Corwin, supra note 75, at 119–23; Wright, supra note 61, at 237–46. Where sole executive
agreements relate to military affairs, however, they are often justified by reference to the
127
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doctrine have played in helping build the President’s sole executive
agreement powers therefore reaches beyond these two particular types of
agreements.
IV. PAST PRACTICE TODAY
The prior Part described the debt that the President’s expansive foreign affairs powers owe to international law. It showed how constitutional actors who favored presidential power relied on international legal
principles in justifying accruals of presidential power vis-à-vis Congress. The practices discussed in the prior Part, however, all took place
in the past, mostly in the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth centuries.
In this Part, I turn to the practice of foreign relations law today, and to
the roles played or not played by international law. I do so by looking at
three assertive exercises of presidential foreign affairs powers by the
Obama Administration in the last few years: its stance on the recognition
power taken in Zivotofsky v. Clinton; its military intervention in Libya
without Congressional authorization; and its apparent assertion that the
President can ratify the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(“ACTA”) on behalf of the United States as a sole executive agreement.
On the face of the Administration’s defense of these actions, international law matters little, if at all, to the constitutional separation of foreign affairs powers today. Consistent with the separation-of-powers
anomaly discussed in Part II, the legal justifications given for the President’s actions do not treat international law as a background principle of
constitutional interpretation or indeed even rely on it as an input for other principles of constitutional interpretation. Yet this does not mean that
international law has played no role in defining the current practices. For
what these justifications do rely on—and rely on primarily—are either
the past practices that were described in Part III or later practices that
were in turn derivative of those practices. Since these past practices are
now used without any consideration of their international legal roots,

commander-in-chief clause. E.g., Corwin, supra note 75, at 117–18. Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s dicta in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. supporting international
agreements made other than through the Treaty Clause does not specifically rely on the
claims settlement agreements or modi vivendi, although it does rely on international law
more generally. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“[T]he power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense . . . [while not] expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception
of nationality. . . . [based on] the law of nations.”).
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however, the role that international law played in creating them is forgotten and the nuances that international law might bring to their interpretation are lost.
A. Zivotofsky
During the 2011 term, the Supreme Court considered a showdown between Congress and the President over whether U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem could list “Israel” as their nation of birth on their U.S. passports.133 Congress had passed a statute requiring that the State
Department allow U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem to do so,134 but the
Obama Administration refused to enforce this statute. Noting a consistent executive policy since the Eisenhower Administration of not recognizing Jerusalem as part of any state, the executive branch claimed
that this statute violated an exclusive presidential power to recognize
foreign states.135
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, an American citizen born in Jerusalem challenged the executive branch’s refusal to enforce the Congressional statute. The district court and the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case as barred
by the political question doctrine, but the Supreme Court reversed, with
eight justices agreeing that the case was justiciable. Although the merits
were fully briefed and argued, the Court chose not to address them, but
rather remanded for the D.C. Circuit to address the merits in the first instance.136 The D.C. Circuit had not decided this case at the time this
piece was finalized for publication, but the original D.C. Circuit opinion
suggests that the court will agree with the Obama Administration that
the President has an exclusive recognition power upon which the statute
impermissibly intrudes.137

133

Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2012).
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat.
1350, 1366 (2002). In a signing statement, President George W. Bush had stated that this
statutory provision (and other associated ones) unconstitutionally interfered with his recognition powers. See Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1425.
135
Brief for the Respondent at 13, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10699).
136
Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1430–31.
137
Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (asserting that is
has been “clear from the earliest days of the Republic” that the recognition power “belongs
solely to the President”); see also id. at 1245 (Edwards, J., concurring) (concluding that the
statute “impermissibly intrudes on the President’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns”).
134
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Throughout the briefing and oral argument, past practice formed the
backbone of the executive branch’s assertion of an exclusive recognition
power. The brief for the Secretary of State emphasized that
“[l]ongstanding Executive Branch practice, congressional acquiescence,
and judicial precedent establish that the President[] . . . [has] the exclusive power to recognize foreign states and their governments.”138 It devoted seven pages to the past practices of recognition, including President Washington’s decision to recognize the revolutionary government
of France and the back-and-forth between Congress and the President
over the recognition of Cuba.139 At oral argument, the Solicitor General
also spent substantial time on historical practice and argued that it was
“critical as a matter of history . . . that there is not a single piece of legislation that has passed both houses of Congress and come to the President
purporting to recognize a foreign nation.”140
Although the executive branch lawyers emphasized past practice, they
did not mention international law’s role in shaping past practice or otherwise treat international law as relevant to the constitutional question.
The brief for the Secretary of State treated the past practices as growing
out of domestic considerations. When it relied on the Washington Administration’s decision to recognize the revolutionary government of
France, it did not mention the role that international law played in this
constitutional precedent; and although its discussion of the dispute over
the recognition of Cuba referenced Senator Hale’s memorandum, it did
not note the international-law-based reasoning underpinning this memorandum.141 The treatment of the sole organ doctrine is particularly striking. It is mentioned, to be sure, but its international legal underpinnings
are not. Instead, the brief treats the sole organ doctrine as reflecting a
138
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135, at 14. As a textual matter, the brief also emphasized the Receive Ambassadors Clause, see, e.g., id., but at oral argument, the Solicitor
General acknowledged that this clause was not essential to his argument. See Transcript of
Oral Argument at 42, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10-699).
139
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135 at 18–24.
140
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 25; see also id. at 25, 28–30 (discussing past practice).
141
Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135, at 18–24. The reply brief for Zivotofsky,
however, does claim that international law shaped the Washington Administration’s decision. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 5–7, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012) (No. 10699) (citing Professor Reinstein’s work). Justice Kennedy asked Zivotofsky’s counsel one
question in relation to this argument, Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 55–56,
but the discussion of the recognition power in the Court’s eventual opinion made no reference to international law. See generally Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. 1421.
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principle of domestic expediency—one aimed at “avoiding conflicting
foreign-policy pronouncements among the three Branches.”142 By ignoring how international law has helped shape past practice, constitutional
actors in the executive branch thus presented a different—and much
stronger case—for the President’s recognition power than the historical
record reflects.
B. Libya
President Obama’s decision to use force in Libya demonstrates just
how much the executive’s independent war powers have developed
since the Founding. On March 19, 2011, following a U.N. Security
Council Resolution authorizing the use of force, President Obama and
European allies initiated “a military intervention on a scale not seen in
the Arab world since the Iraq war.”143 “Operation Odyssey Dawn” enforced a no-fly-zone over Libya and carried out extensive bombing of
strategic targets in order to “prevent[] Qaddafi from overrunning those
who oppose him.”144 In advising the President that he could constitutionally undertake this intervention without congressional authorization, the
Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) relied mainly on past practice, explaining that “[e]arlier opinions of this Office and other historical precedents establish the framework for our analysis.”145
In its memorandum, OLC’s use of international law was notably limited. Unlike the State Department’s memorandum on the President’s use
of force in Korea, the OLC memorandum did not directly rely on international law in its constitutional interpretation. Instead, for OLC, the only legal relevance of the Security Council’s resolution was that it triggered an “important” U.S. interest—namely, “preserving the credibility
and effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council.”146 Gone was
the argument that the President had the independent authority under the
Take Care Clause to implement a Security Council Resolution, and gone
was the claim that the Security Council Resolution changed the nature of

142

Brief for the Respondent, supra note 135, at 27.
David D. Kirkpatrick et al., Allies Open Air Assault on Qaddafi’s Forces, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 20, 2011, at A1.
144
Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5.
145
Id. at 6.
146
Id. As noted supra note 26 and accompanying text, the Security Council Resolution
may have also been tacitly used as a source of extra-constitutional legitimacy.
143
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the action from “war” to “police action.”147 Instead, OLC simply relied
on past practice, mostly of recent vintage, including a 1980 OLC Memorandum on Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad without
Statutory Authorization and the OLC memoranda supporting the 1992
intervention in Somalia, the 1995 deployment to Bosnia, and the 2004
intervention in Haiti.148
These prior OLC memoranda in turn relied heavily on past practices
in which international law played a role, but ignored or watered down
how international law helped justify these practices. In terms of minor
engagements, the memoranda simply emphasized the large number of
times the President has used force abroad with little discussion of the
contemporaneous justifications given for these uses.149 Durand v. Hollins and the bombardment of Greytown became straightforward precedents for the President’s power to respond to attacks against American
citizens without any consideration of either the international legal roots

147

See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. Intriguingly, several foreign relations
law scholars felt it necessary to articulate why, in their view, the Security Council Resolution
did not change the legal analysis presented—even though the Obama Administration was not
formally arguing otherwise. See Michael J. Glennon, Forum: The Cost of “Empty Words”: A
Comment on the Justice Department’s Libya Opinion, Harv. Nat’l Security J. 7–14, (2011),
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Forum_Glennon.pdf; Statement by Louis
Fisher before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Libya and War Powers 1, 3 (June
28, 2011), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fisher_Testimony.pdf. These responses may reflect frustration with the role the Security Council Resolution was playing as
an extra-constitutional source of legitimacy.
148
Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6–9 (drawing primarily on these memoranda and
the interventions they authorized). The President’s initial decision to use force in Libya
without congressional authorization was basically consistent with these practices. His decision to continue using force in Libya, however, was a more dramatic break from precedent,
as this decision was difficult to reconcile with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution. See Trevor W. Morrison, Forum: Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and
the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 62–63, 66
(2011).
149
Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to the Counsel for the President, Proposed Deployment of United States Armed
Forces into Bosnia 4 n.4 and accompanying text (Nov. 30, 1995), available at
www.justice.gov/olc/bosnia2.htm [hereinafter Bosnia Memorandum]; Memorandum from
Timothy E. Flanigan, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to William P.
Barr, Attorney General, Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia 3 n.2 and
accompanying text (Dec. 4, 1992), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/presiden.8.htm
[hereinafter Somalia Memorandum]; Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to the Counsel for the President, Deployment of
United States Armed Forces to Haiti 2 (Mar. 17, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/2004/legalityofdeployment.pdf [hereinafter Haiti Memorandum].
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of this power or the relevance of Greytown’s piratical character.150 Even
more interesting was the way the memoranda relied on treaty-based
precedents and yet downplayed the importance of the treaty obligations
in describing these precedents. All four memoranda explicitly used the
Korean War as a precedent but described it in ways that minimized the
role that international law played in its constitutional justification.151
(This occurred even though the interventions at issue in the Haiti and
Somalia memoranda were, like the Korean War, authorized by the U.N.
Security Council, and one might therefore think the international legal
reasoning used in the Korean War would have been applicable.) None of
the four memoranda suggested that the Security Council’s role might affect whether the intervention constitutes a “war.” Only the oldest of
these memoranda—the 1980 one—reiterated the claim that the President
has authority under the Take Care Clause to use force to advance U.S.
international legal commitments and the memorandum was hesitant to
treat the Korean War as an example of this authority.152 The later three
memoranda simply dropped the Take Care Clause justification altogether.153 These three memoranda did rely on the one remaining use of international law for constitutional purposes made during the Korean War:

150
See Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980) [hereinafter Presidential Power Memorandum]; Somalia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 3; Haiti Memorandum, supra note 149, at 2–3.
151
Two memoranda used the Korean and Vietnam Wars as precedential support for unilateral presidential power to initiate hostilities. Presidential Power Memorandum, supra note
150, at 187–89 (treating the Korean and Vietnam Wars as appropriate precedents for presidential initiation of hostilities, although noting the need of congressional approval for sustaining the operations); Bosnia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 3 (citing approvingly to the
Vietnam and Korean Memoranda as support for unilateral presidential action without reference to their treaty-based arguments, although noting in a footnote that it was “unnecessary”
to consider whether presidential power reached as far as to cover the Korean War); id. at 4
n.5. The other two used it only in claiming that supporting the United Nations is an interest
of the United States as described infra note 154.
152
Presidential Power Memorandum, supra note 150, at 186 (observing that “[t]he President also derives authority from his duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’
for both treaties and customary international law are part of our law and Presidents have repeatedly asserted authority to enforce our international obligations even when Congress has
not enacted implementing legislation,” but qualifying this claim in a footnote); id. at 188 n.7
(stating, in relation to Korea, that “[a]lthough support for this introduction of our armed
forces into a ‘hot’ war could be found in the U.N. Charter and a Security Council resolution,
the fact remains that this commitment of substantial forces occurred without congressional
approval”).
153
This abandonment of the Take Care Clause argument by the executive branch thus predates the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas discussed supra note 29.
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the claim that support for the United Nations constitutes a key U.S. interest. Even here, however, the argument was watered down: Where this
was a “paramount” U.S. interest in the Korea Memorandum, it slipped to
being a “vital” U.S. interest in the Somalia and Bosnia, and Haiti interventions154—and, as noted above, dwindled still further in the Libya
Memorandum to being simply an “important” U.S. interest.155
Constitutional decision-making on the use of force has thus become
almost entirely divorced doctrinally from international law, even though
international law helped justify past practices on which the current doctrine relies. This divorce has important implications for the President’s
power to initiate military interventions without congressional support.
On the one hand, international law no longer provides a direct boost to
presidential power as a matter of doctrine (though it may still serve as a
source of extra-constitutional legitimacy). This is not very significant,
however, because international law is no longer directly needed for these
boosts—instead, constitutional actors can support sole presidential uses
of force simply by pointing to past practices without further considering
the international legal roots of these practices. On the other hand—and
more significantly—the divorce between constitutional decision-making
and international law means that international law no longer supplies
any recognized limits on the President’s power to initiate military interventions. International law has ceased to be used as a boundary between
constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally dubious independent
presidential uses of force; instead, recent OLC memoranda treat the
President as having the constitutional authority to initiate the use of
force in violation of international law.156
C. The ACTA
As with the Libya intervention, the constitutional question of whether
the United States can ratify the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as

154
Somalia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 4 (quoting “paramount” language from the
Korea Memorandum as well); Bosnia Memorandum, supra note 153, at 5; Haiti Memorandum, supra note 153, at 4 (quoting “paramount” language from the Korea Memorandum as
well).
155
Libya Memorandum, supra note 1, at 6, 10, 12; see also id. at 12 (quoting the Bosnia
Memorandum for the word “vital,” though not directly applying it to the Libya intervention).
156
See Somalia Memorandum, supra note 149, at 1 (noting in cover memo that a Security
Council Resolution is not a “precondition” for presidential action); Haiti Memorandum, supra note 149, at 4 (same).
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a sole executive agreement has so far remained outside the courts. The
ACTA is an international agreement negotiated among an important
group of developed countries that mandates strong enforcement efforts
and tough penalties for intellectual property violations.157 U.S. law already satisfies most or all of the ACTA’s requirements,158 but, if the
United States were to ratify the ACTA, it would be committed to these
requirements as a matter of international law, rather than simply domestic law. Because the ACTA is controversial—its ratification is opposed
by some influential organizations who deem it too harsh an enforcement
regime159—it would be very difficult for the President to obtain the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate in support of it (or alternatively to get Congress to approve it as a congressional-executive agreement). As a result, the constitutional question is critically important to
whether the United States will ratify the ACTA. If the President has the
power to ratify this agreement as a sole executive agreement, then he
can do so whenever he chooses; but if he needs Congress or the Senate,
then ratification will be impossible or, at best, a difficult fight that requires the expenditure of significant political capital.
Unlike with Zivotofsky and the Libya intervention, the executive
branch has not produced any extensive, publicly available explanation of
why it considers that the President can constitutionally ratify the ACTA
as a sole executive agreement. To date, we only have brief assertions by
executive-branch officials—mostly contained in letters responding to the
inquiries of a member of Congress160—plus some academic scholarship
157
See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 243, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2417.
158
Oona A. Hathaway & Amy Kapczynski, Going It Alone: The Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement as a Sole Executive Agreement, ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110824.pdf (noting dispute over whether the ACTA
is fully compatible with existing U.S. domestic law).
159
Id. at 3 (noting concerns raised by a coalition that includes Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and eBay). Advocacy groups favoring Internet freedom such as EFF are also opponents. See, e.g., Maira Sutton & Parker Higgins, We Have Every Right to be Furious about
ACTA, Electronic Frontier Foundation, (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2012/01/we-have-every-right-be-furious-about-acta. Resistance to ACTA has already led the
European Parliament to reject it. See Charles Arthur, ACTA down, but not out, as Europe
vote against controversial treaty, The Guardian at 1 (July 4, 2012, 9:24 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jul/04/acta-european-parliament-votes-against.
160
See sources cited supra note 3. Some commentators have read the Obama Administration as claiming it can ratify the ACTA as an ex ante congressional-executive agreement,
since a letter by State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh notes that the “ACTA was negotiated in response to express congressional calls for international cooperation to enhance
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exploring the constitutional question in more depth.161 As support for its
argument that the ACTA can be ratified as a sole executive agreement,
the executive branch has relied primarily on past practice. The oldest
practice it cites is the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),162 and it also cites a “long line” of later, more minor trade
agreements which were ratified as sole executive agreements.163
The executive branch’s limited public defense of its position makes
analysis of its legal reasoning and of the historical pedigree it relies upon
more difficult than with Zivotofsky and the Libya intervention. Nonetheless, it seems that international law is not playing any direct role in the
constitutional question of whether the President can ratify the ACTA as
a sole executive agreement. The executive branch pronouncements on
this question, such as they are, do not suggest that international law is
playing any direct part; and nor does the scholarship produced to date on
the issue.164 Like the other examples, however, this does not mean that
international law has not influenced the constitutional analysis, but rather any such influence must lie in how international law helped develop
the past practices that built the President’s sole executive agreement
power. As discussed earlier, international legal concepts indeed help develop these practices, including ones in the claims settlement and modus
enforcement of intellectual property rights.” Letter from Harold Koh, supra note 3, at 1; Jack
Goldsmith, The Doubtful Constitutionality of ACTA as an Ex Ante Congressional-Executive
Agreement, Lawfare Blog (May 21, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/05/
the-doubtful-constitutionality-of-acta-as-an-ex-ante-congressional-executive-agreement/. I
view this argument as a secondary one, however, since (1) Koh’s letter does not disavow the
sole executive agreement justification, see generally Letter from Harold Koh, supra note 3;
and (2) as a matter of statutory construction, it is difficult to read the statute cited in Koh’s
letter as congressional authorization of ACTA’s ratification. See Goldsmith, supra. An even
more recent speech by Koh suggests that he would view an executive branch ratification of
ACTA as falling on a spectrum between ex ante congressional-executive agreement and a
sole executive agreement. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Thomas F. Ryan
Lecture at Georgetown University Law School, Twenty-First Century International Lawmaking (Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/199319.htm.
161
See Sean Flynn, ACTA’s Constitutional Problem: The Treaty Is Not a Treaty, 26 Am.
U. Int’l L. Rev. 903, 904 (2011); Hathaway & Kapczynski, supra note 158.
162
USTR Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
163
Letter from Ron Kirk, supra note 3, at 1; Letter from Harold Koh, supra note 3, at 2.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of these sole executive agreements
but has held that they should not affect its interpretation of previously enacted congressional
statutes. See Quality King Distribs. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1998)
(finding three of the executive agreements later cited in the Kirk Letter to be “irrelevant” to a
statutory interpretation question before it).
164
See generally sources cited supra notes 3 and 160.
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vivendi context that helped cement the President’s sole executive agreement power.165
V. RETHINKING PRESIDENTIAL POWER
So far, this Article has been mostly descriptive. I have shown that
while today international law is rarely if at all used as a direct principle
of constitutional interpretation in resolving separation of powers disputes, historically constitutional actors drew on it in resolving these disputes in favor of the President. This Part considers implications that this
account holds for our present understanding of presidential power. I first
argue that this account offers grounds for skepticism, or at least for careful scrutiny, regarding arguments based on past practice. I then briefly
turn to consider the role that international law could play in separation of
powers interpretation today.
A. Skepticism About Past Practice
There are several reasons why past practice is important to constitutional interpretation. It can serve as an input for originalist thinking (as
when it signals the views of constitutional actors who themselves had
been Framers), but it can also stand alone as a principle of constitutional
interpretation. Professors Bradley and Morrison suggest that it can have
the Burkean quality of “reflect[ing] collective wisdom generated by the
judgments of numerous actors over time.”166 It also can serve the same
165
Additionally, in the specific context of the GATT, early executive branch justifications
relied on the President’s sole organ powers. Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act:
Hearing on H.R. 1211 Before the S. Comm. On Finance, 81st Cong. 1051 (1947) (statement
of Winthrop G. Brown, Director, Office of Int’l Trade Policy, Dep’t of State) (“Under the
Constitution the President, as the organ of the United States Government for the conduct of
foreign affairs, has broad authority to discuss any matter of foreign relations with other governments and come to tentative agreement with them as to how such matters should be handled.”) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). The relevance of the GATT as a precedent for sole executive trade agreements is far more
complicated that USTR’s reference to it in its Fact Sheet on ACTA suggests. President Truman embraced a “provisional” agreement applying the GATT pending the GATT’s formal
ratification in a way similar to Theodore Roosevelt’s modus vivendi with the Dominican Republic (though the provisional agreement lasted far longer, as the GATT itself was never ratified). See Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 Calif. L. Rev. 671, 751–52 (1998). The executive branch defended this provisional agreement as a mixture of a sole executive agreement and an ex ante congressionalexecutive agreement. See id
166
Bradley & Morrison, supra note 23, at 426.
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values of consistency, predictability, efficiency, and protection of reliance interests that respect for precedent serves in the context of judicial
decision-making.167 But, as with judicial precedents, the power of past
practice to actually advance these values is not absolute. Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. warned against overreliance on past practice when he complained about following a rule simply because it was “laid down in the
time of Henry IV”—and noted that it was “still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.”168 Prior practices
may not fit a present situation, even if these prior practices were wise
ones for their times. Moreover, these prior practices may reflect poor
initial decision-making or be narrower than their subsequent invocations
suggest.
This Article’s exploration of past foreign relations practice offers at
least two reasons in favor of subjecting arguments rooted in past practice
to more rigorous scrutiny than they presently receive. First, in line with
Justice Holmes’s observation, I have shown that past practices establishing the constitutional separation of powers rest in part on the use of international law as a principle of constitutional interpretation—a use
which is not comparably found today. Its absence today stems from a
matter of principle on the part of constitutional actors who do not favor
the use of international law as a principle of constitutional interpretation
and from a matter of practice from constitutional actors who do favor
such a role but use it primarily in the individual rights context.
Both groups have reason to be wary of past practices that rest in part
on the use of international law as principle of constitutional interpretation. Those constitutional actors and scholars who do not favor the use
of international law in constitutional interpretation might not wish to rely on past practices which are grounded on such uses. And those constitutional actors who do favor the use of international law in constitutional
interpretation should be concerned about relying on past practices where
these practices rest in part on international legal principles that have
since faded or vanished entirely. The structure of international law has
changed substantially since the nineteenth century, both in terms of what
it covers and how it is understood to operate. The sole organ doctrine
that spurred the President’s recognition power, for example, is no longer
167
168

Id. at 427–28.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
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as important to international law as it was in the nineteenth century.169
To give another example, international law regarding the use of force
has changed dramatically since it was used in establishing past practices
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it now sets rigorous
doctrinal limits on when the use of force is permissible. Such developments raise serious questions about whether the premises undergirding
past practices still remain valid.
Second, the uses of past practice explored in this Article suggest that
the strength and applicability of past practices are often overstated by
supporters of increased presidential power. By ignoring international
law, these supporters miss alternative explanations for why past practices occurred and thus miss the nuances and limitations that these past
practices contain.
The debate over the recognition power illustrates this point. In the Solicitor General’s retelling in Zivotofsky, the Washington Administration’s decision to recognize France becomes a decision “that this is an
exclusive power” of the President,170 rather than a decision in which the
constitutional issue was barely considered, if at all (let alone considered
in terms of whether the power was concurrent or exclusive), and the g
was instead driven by the aim of complying with the law of nations. The
Solicitor General’s emphasis on the absence of congressional statutes
proclaiming recognition similarly overlooks a likely explanation related
to international law in favor of a claim of broad Presidential power under the Constitution. Rather than signaling congressional acceptance of
an exclusive presidential recognition power, this absence instead might
instead show respect for the international legal principle that states conduct their official business through a single representative authority.171
169
See, e.g., Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002) (omitting any discussion of need for states to
maintain a single representative authority); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order
(2004) (describing increasing disaggregation of states at the international level); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 Ohio St. L.J. 649, 667–71 (2002)
(discussing how the norms governing communication have changed).
170
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 28 (emphasis added); see also id. at 25;
Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 18 (characterizing the Washington Administration’s
decision as an “assert[ion of] the sole authority to recognize which government represents a
foreign state”) (emphasis added).
171
See Penfield, supra note 69, at 408. Congress might accordingly consider itself entitled
to participate in the internal decision-making process about recognition (as shown by nineteenth-century legislation closely tied to recognition), while leaving it to the President to undertake the official act of recognition out of respect for international law. This in turn might

GALBRAITH_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

International Law and Separation of Powers

8/20/2013 2:44 PM

1045

By overlooking the role that international law played in shaping past
constitutional practice, the Solicitor General air-brushed out these nuances and enabled a broader claim of presidential power. In turn, the
original D.C. Circuit opinion accepted the executive branch’s characterizations of past practice at face value without looking closely to see
whether these are in fact warranted. It simply repeated the executive
branch’s claim that past practice established the President’s exclusive
recognition power not long after the Framing,172 stating in its opinion
that it has been “clear from the earliest days of the Republic” that the
recognition power “belongs solely to the President.”173 Had the court
looked closely at the actual past practice, however, it would have discovered that nineteenth-century precedents did not resolve whether the
President’s recognition power was exclusive or concurrent with Congress (and indeed arguably favored the latter position).
Although these two points favor increased scrutiny of separation-ofpowers arguments based on past practice, they do not necessarily negate
these arguments. The reasons on which past practices are based may remain entirely or mostly applicable today: The importance of efficiency
and respect for reliance interests may be sufficient to justify the continuance of the practice, or there may be other reasons why its continuance
is desirable. Indeed, I myself believe that past practice is a valuable and
appropriate tool of constitutional interpretation. My claim is simply that
arguments based on past practice should be treated more warily than is
presently the case. It is important to look beneath the surface and see if
past practice really supports what it is said to support and, if so, whether
the reasons underlying this practice remain true today. The need for
scrutiny is especially strong because the executive branch may have incentives to inflate the significance of past practices supporting presidential exercises of power. The other branches should therefore be cautious
in accepting such claims. Greater scrutiny of the sources and scope of
past practices relied on the executive branch might lead courts to substantially different outcomes in separation-of-powers cases.
suggest that Congress can constitutionally legislate on matters that have a close nexus with
recognition, such as birthplace designations on U.S. passports, but that do not constitute official communications between nations.
172
See Brief for Appellee at 23, Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (No. 07-5347) (claiming that “[f]or at least 150 years, it has been settled law that
recognition of foreign sovereigns is a constitutional power vested exclusively in the President”).
173
Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1231.
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B. Using International Law Going Forward
The influence that international law has had on the separation of foreign affairs powers in the past has implications for how international law
could be used in separation of powers jurisprudence today. These implications are far from absolute, as approaches to constitutional interpretation rest as much on normative presumptions as on the lessons of experience. Nonetheless, for those who can normatively accept the prospect of
international law’s use as a direct principle of constitutional interpretation, the past uses described in this Article offer both support and guidance for how it could potentially be used today with regard to the separation of powers.
The past practice described here offers support for the use of international law in the separation of powers because it shows that international
law is not a “new source” of constitutional interpretation in this context,174 but rather an old one. Accordingly, as Sarah Cleveland has observed, “historical practice answers the legitimacy objection that international law is ‘foreign’ to the American constitutional tradition.”175
Indeed, the role that international law has played in helping to bolster
executive power in the past might make it particularly fitting for international law to be considered in assessing the limits of the Presidential
power going forward. As this Article has shown, Presidents accrued
power in the past in part by using international legal arguments, which
in turn have helped deter Congress and the courts from resisting these
exercises of power. Later Presidents then expanded on these practices by
relying on them without recognizing their international legal roots. In
essence, the President’s current powers make use of all the gains gotten
from international law without also being responsive to the limits set by
international law. Returning international law to the interpretive set
would thus assist in recovering the boundary that international law used
to help set between permissible and impermissible sole presidential action.176
174

Contra Alford, supra note 19, at 57–58.
Cleveland, supra note 7, at 7. One can question how much international law today really follows continuously from international law in the nineteenth century, particularly given
developments like human rights law. The examples used in this paper, however, are all ones
that international law regulated in some manner back in the nineteenth century, though its
specific contours have since changed.
176
Cf. Wuerth, supra note 10, at 75–82 (arguing that, historically, the permissible boundaries of the President’s commander-in-chief power were shaped by international law).
175
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The past practices discussed in this Article also suggest that international law might have functional value as a principle of constitutional
interpretation in the separation of powers context. As one example, the
nineteenth century reliance on international law principles in interpreting
the boundary between when the President could use force on his own
versus when he needed congressional authorization had practical advantages: it allowed the President to act swiftly in response to piratical
communities, but encouraged congressional authorization where the
force was aimed at other countries and was therefore more likely to create international frictions. As this suggests, international law can serve
as a useful proxy for assessing what actions might most risk international tensions. In the modern era, U.S. military operations abroad that are in
compliance with international law, such as the Libya intervention authorized by the Security Council, are less likely to cause international
strife than operations in violation of international law. There might
therefore be benefits to a constitutional approach that permitted the President alone to undertake military interventions of up to a certain scale
that are in compliance with international law but that required congressional authorization for military interventions that are in violation of international law. The fit is not perfect—some actions in violation of international law will doubtless cause little international tension, and some
actions in furtherance of it will cause much tension—but it offers an improvement over the current doctrinal divorce between the scope of presidential power and the international consequences of its exercise.177
Past practice alone does not necessarily justify the use of international
law in understanding the domestic separation of power. Nor does it answer every question about how exactly international law might be used,
what kinds of international law might be used, or what might incentivize
constitutional actors to reincorporate international law into their constitutional analysis. All these important questions lie well beyond the scope
of this piece to address. But past practice does provide some clues for
how international law might be used and, for those who view historical

177
The functional value of this appeal is suggested by the fact that the Supreme Court has
interpreted certain congressional statutes to incorporate international law in ways that constrain the President to act in accordance with international law. This is particularly true regarding the interpretation of statutes relevant to the detention and trial by military commission of alleged Al Qaeda combatants. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593–94
(2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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practice as enhancing legitimacy, some basis for thinking it might be appropriate to use it.
CONCLUSION
In 1859, Czar Alexander II came across a soldier standing guard in an
obscure part of his palace garden. Intrigued, he sought to learn why the
soldier was posted there. The answer, which took some trouble to find,
was that long ago Catherine the Great had seen a snowdrop in bloom on
that spot, and ordered that it not be plucked. “This command had been
carried out by placing a sentry on the spot, and ever since then”—
decades after the passing of the snowdrop—“one had stood there all the
year round.”178
Like the sentries of the Czar, the historical gloss remains long after
the original reasons for exercises of presidential power have withered
away. Today, the President is understood to have expansive foreign affairs powers mostly because he has exercised them in the past. What is
largely forgotten is why he initially exercised these powers, even though
the answers might tell us something about the extent to which he should
be doing so today.
This Article has sought to uncover the forgotten role that international
law played in furthering the rise of the President’s foreign affairs powers. It has shown that the President’s expansive foreign affairs powers
developed in part through reasoning based on international law, even
though today they are understood to rest on domestic grounds. In the
process, it has shown that the doctrinal line between domestic and international law was once much more fluid than it is today. Ironically, even
as international law has come to play a greater and greater role in world
affairs, the boundary between international law and U.S. constitutional
law has become steeper and higher.
But the recovery of memory is only a first step. The revelation that
the sentry had been posted to protect long-vanished snowdrops led the
Czar to reassign him—or so one hopes. Similarly, once we begin to understand how the President’s powers vis-à-vis Congress were shaped by
international law, then we can begin to rethink the roles that international law should play in expanding or constraining presidential power.

178
1 Otto von Bismarck, Bismarck, the Man and Statesman 247 (New York and London,
A.J. Butler trans., Harper & Bros. 1899).

